Emergency Committee For American Trade - Publications

SECTION 6: WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

The trade liberalization shaped by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been a major engine of global economic growth. Since the founding of the multilateral trading system, the world economy has grown six-fold, per capita income worldwide has tripled, and hundreds of millions of families around the globe have risen from poverty. The liberalization under the Uruguay Round Agreements alone is expected to produce a $230 billion increase in world GDP and a $745 billion increase in world trade by 2005. For the United States alone, the Uruguay Round is expected to provide an income gain of $600 to $800 a year for the average family of four. Since the Uruguay Round, the WTO has produced agreements on information technology, financial services, and telecommunications, thereby opening up market opportunities in new areas of commerce that will produce even greater global economic growth.

For the United States, this global economic growth has helped the U.S. economy grow from $7 trillion in 1992 to over $10 trillion last year. U.S. exports have grown over 70 percent since 1992. A strong multilateral trading system is essential to maintain the historic growth in the U.S. and the world economy that has occurred over the last half-century.

As discussed in detail in Section 2, the WTO has embarked on new negotiations initiated at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. This section describes the WTO Framework and reviews ongoing WTO activities apart from the negotiations.

WTO Framework

The WTO was created in 1995 by the Uruguay Round Agreements and is the primary multilateral institution governing the conduct of trade between member nations. It is the successor organization to the GATT, which was founded in 1947 under the Bretton Woods Agreement. It is based on the fundamental principles of non-discrimination and most-favored-nation treatment. The legal framework of the WTO encompasses:

the rules of the multilateral trading system under the original GATT, set out under GATT Articles I through XXVIII;
the agreements negotiated during successive GATT negotiations to which all WTO members must subscribe, including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs);
plurilateral agreements on government procurement, aircraft, meat, and dairy in which membership is voluntary; and
dispute settlement and trade policy review mechanisms.

The WTO Agreement is a “single-undertaking,” under which member countries must adhere to the basic WTO rules and all of the agreements that have been negotiated under the GATT and the WTO.

The WTO is not a static institution; it has kept the trading system in step with technological development through the negotiation of agreements on information technology, telecommunications, financial services, and electronic commerce and other initiatives. The WTO rules also have promoted global economic stability by requiring WTO member countries to maintain open markets. The willingness of the United States and other WTO members to resist protectionist pressures to close their markets during the recent Asian financial crisis laid the foundation for financial recovery.

The GATT/WTO has grown from 90 members in 1986 to 147 members in early 2004, accounting for over 90 percent of world trade. An additional 26 countries are in the process of applying for WTO membership, including Russia and Saudi Arabia. Since the early 1980s, WTO membership has grown increasingly diverse, as developing countries now account for more than 80 percent of total WTO membership.

Although WTO dispute settlement is binding, compliance with WTO panel recommendations is voluntary. The WTO has no authority to force a member country to change its domestic laws or policies and, therefore, does not pose a threat to enforcement of U.S. health, safety, or environmental standards. In cases in which a WTO member chooses not to bring itself into conformity with a panel decision, the affected WTO member countries have the right to request compensation or to retaliate.

Despite some adverse decisions against the United States, it is important to remember that the binding dispute settlement process is the backbone of the WTO. While we may not agree with every WTO panel decision, overall the United States has been a major beneficiary of the WTO dispute settlement process, and has prevailed in nearly all of the WTO disputes that it has initiated.

To encourage ongoing liberalization, the WTO framework agreed to in 1994 established the so-called “built-in” agenda that sets out a timetable for the review of existing agreements and a schedule for new negotiations on agriculture and services. The built-in agenda played an important role in maintaining the momentum for trade liberalization in the absence of a consensus on a broad new round of negotiations. The WTO agenda is also set through bi-annual ministerial meetings required under the WTO Agreement.

Major Issues

In addition to the specific issues involved in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations and health policy, WTO members are focused on the following key issues:

Implementation of WTO Agreements

Since 1999, major developing countries, such as Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria, have sought flexibility in the application of implementation deadlines for certain WTO agreements as a pre-condition to their support for further WTO liberalization, including the Doha Development Agenda negotiations. In particular, these countries asked that the moratorium on bringing certain cases against developing countries under the TRIPs agreement be extended, and that implementation deadlines under the TRIMS and Customs Valuation agreements also be extended. Developing countries also sought a review of developed countries’ implementation of their commitments under other agreements, such as the WTO Agreements on Textiles and Clothing, Agriculture, Antidumping, and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

After extensive negotiations in the lead-up to and during the Doha Ministerial, WTO member countries agreed to a separate decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns (Implementation Decision) in addition to the Ministerial Declaration that launched the negotiations. The Implementation Decision set forth approximately 50 initiatives to help developing countries comply with existing Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Antidumping, Textiles and Clothing, Trade-Related Investment Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade. In some cases, the Member Countries agreed to certain interpretations or to refrain from certain actions; in other cases, WTO committees were directed to consider issues further. Among the most significant provisions agreed to were the following:

With regard to textiles and apparel, countries agreed to exercise “particular consideration” before initiating antidumping cases on products from developing countries from 2005 to 2007 and to non-binding language on the early integration of products and effective quota elimination. The United States and Canada resisted, however, developing country demands to liberalize quota growth calculations.
In agriculture, countries agreed to exercise restraint in challenging measures notified under the green box by developing countries to promote rural development and adequately address food security concerns.
In antidumping, countries agreed not to initiate a new investigation on a product within one year of the initiation of a previous investigation, unless circumstances have changed.
In subsidies, countries agreed that countries would be moved off the list of least developed countries excluded from the export subsidy prohibition only if their per capita gross national product exceeded $1,000 for three consecutive years.
In intellectual property, countries agreed not to initiate nullification and impairment cases while the TRIPs Council was reviewing how to handle developing countries’ implementation of the TRIPs agreement. The Implementation Decision also required the WTO to “put into place a mechanism for ensuring the monitoring and full implementation” of the requirement that developed countries provide incentives to encourage technology transfer to developing countries.
The Committee on Trade and Development is directed to make recommendations regarding extending mandatory special and differential treatment to least developed countries.
In several areas, the Implementation Decision urges countries to provide financial or technical assistance to least developed countries.

The final Doha Ministerial Declaration also clarifies that negotiations on outstanding implementation issues will be an “integral part of the Work Programme.” Issues for which there is a negotiating mandate shall be addressed under the mandate and other outstanding issues shall be addressed by relevant WTO bodies.

WTO members also made several new commitments on technical cooperation and capacity-building. The Doha Ministerial Declaration directed the development of a plan to ensure long-term funding for technical assistance. In accordance with this direction, the WTO General Council established the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund in December 2001, with a proposed budget of $9 million, which increases technical assistance by 80 percent. In 2002 and 2003, the United States announced two pledges of $1 million to the WTO’s trade-related technical assistance fund. At the Fifth Ministerial in Cancun, the United States pledged an additional $1.2 million for this purpose. Countries also agreed to the New Strategy for WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity Building and Integration. As well, members undertook specific commitments in particular areas, such as market access, trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, and the environment. The Declaration also directs the WTO Secretariat, in coordination with other relevant agencies, to encourage WTO developing country members to include trade measures in their development strategy as a significant element for reducing poverty. The WTO is also directed to provide technical assistance with other relevant international organizations within a coherent policy framework. In 2002, heads of the WTO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Trade Centre (ITC), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) agreed to provide concrete and coordinated support and technical assistance to help developing and least-developed countries to participate in negotiations and take advantage of the international trading system. In 2002, the WTO and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) signed a memorandum of understanding to deepen cooperation and provide technical assistance on trade negotiations and capacity-building to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The WTO and IADB will establish joint programs to support regional and subregional workshops, meetings, training courses, and analysis of trade policy and multilateral negotiations issues. Work on these issues continued throughout 2003 and 2004.

Finally, ECAT notes that the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Apparel provides that global quotas on textile and apparel imports must be terminated by the end of 2004. ECAT supports the elimination of such quotas and urges all WTO members to fully implement their commitments with respect to this agreement.

ECAT POSITION: Full implementation of WTO agreements is the cornerstone of the multilateral trading system and must remain a top priority on the WTO agenda. The United States should continue to insist that all WTO Members implement the WTO Agreements in a timely and comprehensive manner. Technical assistance and assistance for capacity-building are important tools to help advance the United States’ implementation goals. Developing country concerns regarding implementation should be addressed through increased technical assistance and not become the pretext for renegotiating existing WTO agreements. ECAT urges the Administration to oppose efforts to reopen the TRIPs, TRIMs, or other agreements or to delay full implementation of these agreements. Finally, ECAT looks forward to full implementation of the WTO commitment to lift global textile and apparel quotas at the end of 2004.

WTO Institutional Reforms

Efforts to promote greater participation in the WTO decision-making process by a larger number of WTO member countries and to make the WTO more transparent to the public continued in 2001. The WTO has held meetings with NGO representatives on labor and environment issues, as well as the ministerial agenda. Before a permanent process is created, however, the threshold question of the standing of NGO groups must be addressed. Some NGO organizations have large memberships with elected representatives; others are small organizations that do not represent identifiable constituencies.

At the Doha Ministerial Conference, countries agreed to continue to pursue the goals of greater participation and greater transparency, stating:

“Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO membership, we confirm our collective responsibility to ensure internal transparency and the effective participation of all Members. While emphasizing the intergovernmental character of the organization, we are committed to making the WTO’s operations more transparent, including through more effective and prompt dissemination of information, and to improve dialogue with the public. We shall therefore at the national and multilateral levels continue to promote a better public understanding of the WTO and to communicate the benefits of a liberal, rules-based multilateral trading system.”

Discussions focused in 2003 on proposals made with respect to DSB reform. The United States continues to be in the lead and made two proposals to expand transparency and public access to dispute settlement proceedings. The United States and Chile also proposed new provisions to provide the parties to the dispute greater options in order to settle their disputes.

ECAT POSITION: ECAT supports efforts to expand participation by WTO Members in the WTO process and to increase overall transparency in the WTO, as well as transparency in the dispute settlement process.

WTO Accessions

Another important area of WTO activity this year will be achieving progress on the accession of the 26 countries that have applied to join the WTO. Accession negotiations involve a review of a country’s trade regime and its consistency with WTO obligations. WTO applicants must agree to abide by WTO rules and enter into commercially viable, market-access commitments on goods, services, and agriculture that are negotiated both bilaterally and multilaterally.

Negotiations take place in a Working Party established by the WTO and bilaterally. These negotiations result in four documents: (1) the consolidated schedules containing a country’s market-access commitments for goods and services, the so-called market-access package; (2) the protocol, containing the terms of accession; (3) the working party report; and (4) the draft decision of the working party on the applicant’s request for accession. The market-access package consists of schedules of tariff reductions and other commitments that the applicant country has made on goods, services, and agriculture. Market-access commitments are negotiated bilaterally with WTO member countries and then combined into a single package of concessions, which applies to all WTO member countries on a MFN basis. The protocol of accession is negotiated multilaterally within the WTO working party on accession. The protocol sets out the applicant country’s commitments to abide by WTO rules and provides for transition periods or other special rules. The working party report also contains a discussion of the terms a country has agreed to and the specific commitments that it has made in the course of negotiations. Once the market-access schedules are finalized, they are incorporated into the protocol of accession. The working party then must reach consensus on the draft protocol package that is sent to the WTO General Council for approval. While the General Council has approved all previous accessions by consensus, a country may request a vote. In such a case, approval of an applicant’s accession requires a two-thirds majority vote.

Once accession negotiations are complete, the applicant country must be prepared to implement its WTO obligations and commitments. Each current WTO member country must decide whether to sign the country’s protocol of accession and extend WTO benefits to the new WTO member. WTO members may choose not to apply WTO benefits to a new member pursuant to Article 13 of the WTO. In 2002, WTO members also agreed to accelerate and simplify the accession process for least-developed applicants.

Armenia became the 145th member of the WTO on February 5, 2003, and Macedonia became the 146th member on April 4, 2003. Nepal became the 147th member on April 23, 2004.

Russia’s Proposed Accession

The Working Group on Russia’s accession was established on June 16, 1993, and negotiations have been ongoing since 1995. Russia indicated its interest in accelerating negotiations in 2002 and 2003. At the December 2002 Working Party meeting, WTO members agreed to an accelerated program for the first half of 2003 and urged Russia to make additional progress with respect to the enactment of WTO-related legislation. Progress is currently underway on the draft working party report. Areas that have been identified where additional work is necessary before completing Russia’s accession include sanitary and phytosanitary measures, restrictions on imported pharmaceuticals, antidumping rules, and state-owned enterprises.

In addition to plurilateral discussions, Russia is engaged in active negotiations with approximately 50 countries on goods and 29 countries on services.

ECAT POSITION: ECAT supports the timely accession of Russia and other major countries to the WTO on terms comparable to that agreed to with China and other WTO members.

Status of WTO Committees and Working Parties

Rules of Origin

The WTO began work on the development of harmonized global rules of origin in 1995, with the deadline of completing the work in three years. The new harmonized system would be based on the principle of substantial transformation, under which a product is considered to originate from the country in which substantial transformation takes place. In June 1999, the Technical Committee on Rules of Origin at the World Customs Organization (WCO), which is assisting the WTO in this effort, forwarded to the WTO Committee on Rules of Origin several hundred product-specific issues that could not be resolved on a technical basis.

Progress in the WTO Committee on Rules of Origin has been slow, and the deadline for completion of the harmonized system has been extended several times. In particular, there remain significant unresolved issues in the agriculture and textile chapters.

Trade and Investment

The WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment was established pursuant to the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration to examine the relationship between trade and investment. As discussed in section 2, the Working Group focused its work in 2003 on the Doha Development negotiations issues.

Trade and Competition Policy

The Working Group on Trade and Competition Policy was established under the Singapore Ministerial Declaration in 1996. It studies issues related to the interaction between trade and competition policy.

As discussed in section 2, the Working Group focused its work on the Doha Development negotiations

Trade and Environment

The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was established in 1995. The committee’s mandate is to make recommendations on what changes should be made to WTO rules to encourage a positive interaction between trade and environment measures and to avoid protectionism. Since its formation, one of the main areas of the CTE’s focus has been the relationship between the WTO and trade measures applied pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Discussions in the CTE have supported pursuing environmental problems through cooperative, multilateral action under MEAs. There is no consensus within the CTE on the use of trade sanctions in MEAs, except that in the event a dispute arises between WTO members who are also signatories to a MEA, they should first try to resolve the dispute under the provisions of the MEA.

The CTE has discussed the call for greater transparency in the WTO’s relationship with “civil society,” the term used by the United States to refer to labor, environment, and other non-governmental organizations. To this end, the CTE has held a number of sessions with representatives of civil society on trade and environment issues. In March 1999, the CTE sponsored the High-Level Symposium on Trade and Environment, which was attended by 130 NGOs.

The CTE has stated that trade-related environmental measures should not be required to meet more burdensome transparency requirements than other measures that affect trade. The CTE also has stated that no modifications are needed in WTO rules to ensure adequate transparency for trade-related environmental measures. The CTE established a WTO Environmental Database (EDB) available to WTO members, consisting of all trade-related environmental measures notified to the CTE. With regard to eco-labeling requirements, the CTE has said that such requirements must be non-discriminatory and that the processes for developing and adopting such requirements should be transparent. The CTE is also discussing services and the environment.

The CTE’s work in special session to negotiate the provisions of the Doha Development Agenda are discussed in section 2.

Treatment of Labor Issues in the WTO

The 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration did not establish a WTO working party on trade and labor. Instead, the declaration: (1) renewed the WTO’s commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labor standards, (2) recognized the International Labor Organization (ILO) as the appropriate forum to deal with labor issues, and (3) endorsed the continued collaboration between the WTO and the ILO to support core labor rights.

Since the Singapore Ministerial, the Administration has maintained its efforts to broaden support for core labor rights within the ILO and the WTO. Core labor rights include freedom of association, collective bargaining, non-discrimination, and prohibition of forced labor and abusive child labor. As discussed in section 2, the United States supported the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work adopted in 1998, recognizing core labor rights and establishing a mechanism to monitor compliance. The United States increased funding for the ILO to improve its monitoring and enforcement capabilities. The United States also has sought to build a consensus for greater action against child labor and worked for the adoption of the ILO Convention against the worst forms of child labor which the United States signed and ratified last year.

At the Seattle Ministerial, the United States proposed that the WTO establish a working party to examine the relationship between market-opening measures and the observance of internationally recognized workers rights, as required by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Developing countries led by India, Egypt, and Brazil, adamantly opposed the U.S. proposal on the grounds that it would open the door to protectionist measures and trade sanctions. Such issues, they argued, are best addressed in the ILO. The EU offered a compromise proposal under which a special standing committee would be created outside the WTO to study the ways in which global trade affects workers around the world. The committee would be comprised of representatives from the WTO, the ILO, the World Bank, the IMF, and other multilateral institutions. Angered by then President Clinton’s statements about potential linkages of labor provisions to sanctions during the ministerial meetings, developing countries refused to consider any compromise on the labor issue.

In the lead up to the Fourth WTO Ministerial in Doha, the United States and EU again explored what if any relationship could be established between the WTO and labor issues. Not surprisingly, they faced the same opposition from the developing countries on any linkage at all. As a result, the only discussion of labor issues in the Doha Declaration reaffirmed the declaration from Singapore and took note of the work underway in the ILO on such issues.

ECAT POSITION: ECAT supports efforts to make the WTO more transparent and to conclude work on the rules of origin harmonization in a timely manner. On issues of labor and environment, ECAT believes that these issues are, for the most part, best addressed in alternative fora and through alternative policy approaches. In those cases, however, where there is complementarity between these issues and WTO objectives, efforts should be made to address these objectives jointly and in a cooperative manner as is being considered in the context of negotiations on the interrelationship between WTO rules and multilateral environmental agreements.

Dispute Settlement

While the United States may not agree with all WTO panel decisions, the WTO dispute settlement system on balance has been an effective mechanism in enforcing U.S. rights. The United States has made aggressive use of the dispute settlement process, bringing more complaints than any other WTO member. It has prevailed in the majority of the cases that it has filed and successfully defended America’s ability to enforce its rights under international trade agreements under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 from a challenge brought by the EU.

Since the establishment of the WTO, 311 complaints have been filed. Through March 2004, the United States has brought 64 complaints, of which 21 were successfully resolved without litigation. Of the 24 cases that were resolved through panel proceedings, the United States has won 21 and only lost three cases on the core issues raised. The United States has been the subject of 77 complaints filed by other countries (including multiple complaints involving the same underlying matter). The United States has successfully defended nine of the resulting 31 completed panel proceedings, but lost 22 cases. As explained by the 2004 Economic Report of the President, “these statistics suggest that WTO complaints are not brought frivolously, in the sense that complaints, whether by or against the United States, have a high probability of success.”

The WTO dispute settlement system is currently being tested in several disputes between United States and the EU on the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) provisions, the EU’s ban on hormone-treated beef, and U.S. trade remedy cases, which are discussed in more depth in sections 3, 5 and 12. In a number of cases, the United States and EU have failed to implement the WTO’s rulings. While several of these cases are politically sensitive, it is critically important for the United States and the EU to set a positive example for other WTO members that decisions of the WTO will be respected. ECAT strongly supports efforts by the United States and EU to address these differences in a mutually agreeable manner and find solutions that liberalize trade and ensure that the competitiveness of U.S. companies is not undermined.

Despite the fact that the United States was the chief architect of the WTO dispute settlement system and one of its largest beneficiaries, concern has grown in the United States over a number of WTO decisions against the United States. This has led to a number of proposals to establish a commission to review WTO dispute decisions, including the following:

S. 676, World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Review Commission Act, introduced by Senators Baucus (D-MT) Craig (R-ID), Rockefeller (D-WV), and Bayh (D-IN), to provide that a commission of retired federal judges will review WTO decisions. Under S. 676, the Commission would be composed of five retired federal appellate judges who would review WTO decisions adverse to the United States to determine whether panels exceeded their authority under the WTO agreements or otherwise acted improperly, as well as any other reports requested by the U.S. Trade Representative or the Chairmen or Ranking Members of the House Ways and Means or Senate Finance Committees. The Commission would then be required to report its findings to Congress.
S. 592, Save American Manufacturing Act, introduced by Senator Hollings (D-SC), to provide, among other provisions, for the establishment of a WTO Review Commission. This Commission, to be made up of five active federal circuit judges, would similarly review WTO decisions adverse to the United States. If the Commission finds that a WTO panel has failed to apply properly WTO rules, any member of Congress may introduce a joint resolution directing the President to undertake negotiations to modify or amend the WTO dispute settlement rules. If there are three affirmative determinations by the Commission, any member of Congress is authorized to introduce a joint resolution to withdraw Congressional approval of the WTO agreements. Both resolutions would be considered on an expedited basis.
S. 1258, the Stand With American Workers Act, introduced by Senator Bayh (D-IN), to designate a Deputy USTR to oversee all WTO dispute settlement cases and to establish a WTO Review Commission. If the Review Commission made determinations that three WTO dispute settlement panels violated certain criteria, the President is required to submit a plan for fundamental reform of the WTO dispute settlement system. TPA procedures would cease to apply until the President submitted such a plan and Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing USTR to negotiate such reforms.
H.R. 2365, Trade Law Reform Act, introduced by Representative English (R-PA), to, among other things, establish a Congressional Advisory Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement. This Commission would examine, through public hearings and in other ways, whether WTO panels reaching an adverse decision with regard to a U.S. law have acted properly.
H.R. 4177, American Workers and Manufacturers Support Act, introduced by Representative Larson (D-CT) and others, to, among other issues, create a WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission modeled after S. 592.

It is not clear that a review body of judges or retired judges is either necessary or appropriate to review WTO cases. While the goal of depoliticizing this issue is important, such a review body, particularly with its narrow focus on cases adverse to the United States, could just as easily heighten, not diminish, political sensitivities. If such a review body were formed, it is extremely important that it look at WTO decisions broadly, including perhaps decisions in which the United States is not even a party, rather than focus primarily or exclusively on cases with rulings adverse to the United States. Focusing only on cases adverse to the United States would necessarily result in a slanted view of the activities of WTO dispute settlement. Furthermore, unlike current proposals, the members of any review body must have expertise in the area of trade and international law, in particular relating to the WTO, in order to ensure the highest possible caliber review. While federal judges, whether active or retired, may have considered a wide range of issues when on the Federal Court, it is a different matter entirely to engage in a systematic review of a multitude of highly technical, complex cases decided under WTO – not U.S. – jurisprudence. To provide a thorough report that is respected and will address these issues appropriately, expertise in this field is required. To ensure impartiality and objectivity, the members of any such body must be chosen in a non-political manner, unlike the current proposals. Finally, ECAT strongly opposes any effort to link such reports to resolutions of disapproval or withdrawal. Congress already enjoys the authority to review the WTO. The creation of an additional expedited process, as proposed in S. 592 or H.R. 4177, would only serve to undermine U.S. participation in the WTO.

ECAT POSITION: ECAT believes that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been effective in resolving many disputes, but has had difficulty in addressing a few highly political disputes, particularly those between the United States and EU. ECAT supports efforts by the United States and EU to address these issues quickly and in a trade-liberalizing manner.

ECAT does not believe that the formation of a body to review WTO decisions adverse to the United States is either necessary or appropriate. If established, any such mechanism should require a review of all relevant cases, not just those adverse to the United States, include only members who are impartial and are experts in trade and international law, and provide a thorough, objective and non-political review of WTO cases.