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SECTION 5: MAJOR TRADE POLICY ISSUES
Building a Consensus on Trade and Investment Liberalization
Between 2002 and 2004, Congress took important steps in building a consensus on trade and investment liberalization policies with the passage of the Trade Act of 2002 and approval of the U.S.-Chile, U.S.-Singapore, U.S.-Australia and U.S.-Morocco FTAs by significant bipartisan majorities. Nevertheless, there remain deep divides on the role, objectives and value of U.S. trade policy.
ECAT believes it is critical for the United States to rebuild a national and bipartisan consensus on the value of trade and investment liberalization – a consensus that existed for decades following World War II. We must effectively demonstrate that expansionary trade and investment policies are essential to U.S. economic growth, including the growth of the new economy, and the high U.S. standard of living.
ECAT is working with the Administration, Congress and others in the private sector to help rebuild this consensus. An important part of this endeavor involved ECAT’s multi-year effort to document the importance of trade and investment liberalization in generating prosperity in the United States in the 1990s, as discussed in more depth in section 1.
ECAT POSITION: ECAT supports efforts by the Administration, Congress, and the private sector to rebuild the consensus on the importance of trade and investment liberalization.
Congressional Approval of the U.S.-Australia and U.S.-Morocco FTAs
In July 2004, Congress approved, by strongly bipartisan majorities, both the U.S.-Australia and U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) – raising to eight the number of FTAs concluded and implemented by the United States. The U.S.-Australia FTA entered into force on January 1, 2005 and the U.S.-Morocco FTA is expected to enter into force later this year.
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement
The U.S.-Australia FTA was approved by the House, by a vote of 314-to-109 on July 14, 2004, and by the Senate, by a vote of 80-to-16 on July 15th. The FTA entered into force on January 1, 2005.
Australia is already the United States’ 21st largest trading partner and its 13th largest export market, accounting for $14.3 billion in U.S. exports in 2004. Australia’s exports to the United States equaled $7.5 billion in 2004. The vast majority of U.S. exports to Australia has been composed primarily of manufactured goods (over 90 percent of total exports) as opposed to agricultural products.
Major Provisions
Among the primary provisions of the U.S.-Australia FTA are the following:
- Agriculture: Provides that all U.S. agricultural exports to Australia will be duty-free immediately upon entry into force of the FTA. Such exports currently total more than $400 million. The United States and Australia also agreed to work to address sanitary and phytosanitary concerns through a new bilateral mechanism for scientific cooperation. Australia also agreed to work with the United States in the WTO negotiations to develop export competition disciplines to address concerns about Australia’s state trading enterprises.
- Manufactured Goods: Provides that immediately upon entry into force of the FTA, more than 99 percent of U.S. manufactured goods will be duty-free, which manufacturers estimate could result in an additional $2 billion in exports to Australia each year. Tariffs on qualifying textile and apparel goods will phase out over 10 years.
- Services: Expands access to Australia’s services markets, including in such key areas as telecommunications, distribution, express delivery, computer and related services, audiovisual and entertainment and construction.
- Investment: Exempts new investments in Australia from Australia’s investment screening mechanism and increases the threshold for review with respect to acquisitions of existing investments to A$800 million. While expanding opportunities and access for investment in Australia, the FTA does not include an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, as discussed further below.
- Intellectual Property Rights: Includes state-of-art protections for trademarks, patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, including stronger penalties, patent term restoration and data exclusivity.
- Information Technology: Includes commitments to non-discrimination and national treatment of digital products, and no imposition of customs duties on products delivered electronically.
- Government Procurement: Expands the ability of U.S. companies to bid on Australian government contracts, covering 80 percent of purchases by Australia’s central government. Also requires transparent, predictable and fair tendering procedures.
- Transparency: Includes state-of-the-art transparency standards, including with respect to regulatory and customs matters.
- Labor and environment: Requires Australia to enforce effectively its domestic labor and environmental laws. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to International Labor Organization principles and that it is inappropriate to weaken or reduce labor or environmental protections to encourage trade or investment. The parties also agreed to ensure that their environmental laws provide for high levels of environmental protection.
- Dispute settlement: Provides that obligations in commercial, labor and environment areas are enforceable through a strong and innovative dispute settlement system allowing for monetary fines and other penalties for the failure to meet commitments.
Opportunities Created
The U.S.-Australia FTA represents a groundbreaking agreement by eliminating virtually all agricultural and manufacturing tariffs between the countries on the first day of implementation. This is among the most front-loaded FTAs that the United States has concluded. As a result, it will provide immediately upon implementation concrete benefits to U.S. farmers, manufacturers and their employees, and the U.S. economy. Key manufacturing sectors that will benefit include autos and auto parts, chemicals, construction equipment, electrical machinery, fabricated metal products, information technology goods, medical and scientific equipment, and paper and wood products. In agriculture, the FTA will substantially expand access for U.S. farmers and producers of soybeans and oilseeds, fruits, vegetables and certain processed foods. U.S. service providers and investors will also enjoy expanded access in a number of important sectors.
Differences from Other FTAs
In addition to being one of the most front-loaded of any U.S. FTA as discussed above, the U.S.-Australia FTA deviates from other recently concluded FTAs in at least four other major respects:
First, it is not comprehensive, by failing to provide any increased access, let alone tariff-free access, to the U.S. sugar market for Australian sugar exports. This represents a significant deviation from a policy of no exclusions and has already resulted in requests by other sectors to be excluded from the next round of FTAs and the FTAA.
Second, the FTA fails to include investor-state dispute settlement provisions, rendering the investment chapter effectively unenforceable except through a state-to-state process that is too often politicized. Obviously, U.S. investors will still have recourse to Australia’s advanced legal system, with its respected judiciary, but the specific provisions in the FTA on investment will not, as in other FTAs, be enforceable by the investors. Australia’s refusal to accept this provision, particularly after it was just included in Australia’s FTA with Singapore puts U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage. The FTA contemplates that the availability of an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism can be revisited. The investment chapter also fails to provide any protections for investment agreements, which represent one of the most significant forms of U.S. investment abroad.
Third, the FTA makes progress, but fails to reduce fully, the barriers created by Australia’s investment screening mechanism. This is particularly a problem in the area of financial services where Australia retains a significant ability to prevent the U.S. acquisition of a local company.
Finally, the FTA’s provisions on market access for textiles and apparel are particularly limited, adopting not only a yarn forward requirement, but also by failing to eliminate tariffs immediately.
ECAT POSITION: ECAT strongly supports the market-opening opportunities presented by the U.S.-Australia FTA, but remains concerned by its deviation from other recently concluded FTAs in certain key areas.
U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement
The U.S.-Morocco FTA was approved by the Senate by a vote of 85-to-13 on July 21, 2004, and by the House, by a vote of 323-to-99, on July 22nd. The President signed the implementing legislation into law on August 17, 2004. Morocco’s parliament approved the FTA on January 19, 2005 and the FTA is expected to enter into force later this year.
Major Provisions
Among the primary provisions of the U.S.-Morocco FTA are the following:
- Agriculture: Provides expanded access through tariff reduction, tariff elimination and an expansion of tariff rate quotas. U.S. exports of pistachios, cranberries, pecans, whey products, processed poultry products, and pizza cheese will immediately receive duty-free treatment upon entry into force. Tariffs on other products will be phased out in five years, including on walnuts, grapes, pears, and cherries. The Agreement covers all agricultural products. Key U.S. agricultural exports that will also have expanded opportunities include sorghum, corn, soybeans, pork and beef.
- Manufactured Goods: Provides that more than 95 percent of consumer and manufactured exports will be duty-free upon entry into force of the agreement. All remaining tariffs will be removed within 9 years.
- Textiles and Apparel: Provides duty-free treatment for qualifying textiles and apparel (based on a yarn forward rule), with an additional 30 million square meter equivalent allowance for Moroccan exports containing third-country fabric.
- Services: Liberalizes services trade and investment in Morocco through a negative list approach with relatively few exceptions and includes strong disciplines on transparency.
- Investment: Expands investment opportunities and incorporates generally strong protections, including an investor-state mechanism, for U.S. investment.
- Intellectual Property Rights: Includes state-of-art protections for trademarks, patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, including strong penalties, patent term restoration and data exclusivity.
- Information Technology: All parties committed to non-discrimination and national treatment of digital products, and they will not impose customs duties on products delivered electronically.
- Government procurement: Includes important new anti-corruption and transparency rules for government contracting.
- Transparency: Includes state-of-the-art transparency standards, including in such important areas as customs and regulatory rulemaking.
- Labor and environment: Includes commitments to enforce effectively domestic labor and environmental laws. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to International Labor Organization principles and that it is inappropriate to weaken or reduce labor or environmental protections to encourage trade or investment. The parties also agreed to ensure that their environmental laws provide for high levels of environmental protection.
- Dispute settlement: Provides that obligations in commercial, labor and environment areas are enforceable through a strong and innovative dispute settlement system allowing for monetary fines and other penalties for the failure to meet commitments.
Opportunities Created
Morocco is an emerging market with imports from the United States amounting to $545 million in 2004. Leading U.S. exports include aircraft, corn, and machinery, and there have been recent increases in U.S. exports of textiles and pharmaceutical products. Nevertheless, significant barriers exist, including an average tariff of over 20 percent on U.S. imports. This agreement is important to create new opportunities for U.S. companies, workers, farmers and their families. The U.S.-Morocco FTA will help U.S. companies, which are currently at a disadvantage with the EU (which has an association agreement with Morocco covering industrial goods). This agreement will also help Morocco lock in key economic reforms, including initiatives to streamline investment procedures and eliminate barriers to investment.
ECAT POSITION: ECAT supported Congress’ implementation of the U.S.-Morocco FTA and supports its full implementation once it enters into force.
2005 Legislative Trade Policy Proposals
Several legislative trade policy proposals are likely in 2005, including:
- A proposed amendment to force China to modify its currency practices or be subject to WTO-violative 27.5 percent tariffs on all Chinese exports to the United States; and
- Proposed legislation to seek greater trade and investment liberalization may be actively considered by the U.S. Congress before the end of the year.
Proposals to modify the U.S. trade remedy laws and to reform trade adjustment assistance are discussed later in this chapter. Proposals related to WTO dispute settlement are discussed at the end of section 3.
Legislation to Force Changes in China’s Currency or Impose WTO-Violative Tariffs on Imports from China
On April 6, 2005, the Senate voted not to table an amendment introduced by Senators Schumer (D-NY) and Graham (R-SC) to the Foreign Operations Authorization bill that requires China to adopt a market-based currency valuation within six months. If it fails to do so (or make a good faith effort to so), the legislation would impose a 27.5 percent tariff on all imports from China. An agreement has been reached for the Senate to vote on this measure as a stand-alone bill – likely S. 295, introduced by Senators Schumer and Graham – by July 27th.
ECAT strongly opposes the approach taken by both S. 295 and last year’s Section 301 currency petitions.(discussed in section 11). S. 295 puts the United States on the path of violating its own obligations in the WTO and if the tariffs were imposed, it would undoubtedly result in massive retaliation on U.S. exports, to the detriment of farmers, exporters, and workers throughout the entire United States. Based on China’s 2004 exports to the United States, such retaliation could reach $54 billion in just one year on U.S. exports to China.
In addition, adoption of such legislation would send precisely the wrong message to China on how most appropriately and effectively to handle complex global issues, suggesting unilateralism, rather than the rule of law, is appropriate. Such an approach would undermine ongoing discussions between the Administration and the Chinese government on currency issues.
Forcing this type of change in China’s currency policy may also lead to significant destabilization of the Chinese economy and financial system, in a manner that would harm, not help, U.S. commercial interests. Furthermore, precipitate action by China on currency valuation that is called for by the amendment could have significant destabilizing effects on the global financial system on which the United States is dependent. To the extent that action is warranted, we believe that the Administration has a multitude of more effective diplomatic and policy tools to promote positive change in China in a manner that will benefit U.S. commercial and economic interests.
Finally, adoption of this legislation would undermine broader U.S. national interests in our relationship with China, including stability in Asia and on the Korean peninsula.
ECAT POSITION: ECAT strongly opposes S. 295 and similar legislation that seeks to force a precipitate change in China’s currency policy and would authorize WTO-violative unilateral tariff measures that will undermine the U.S.-China relationship and potentially impose billions of dollars on U.S. exports to China on an annual basis.
Legislation Expanding Trade Preferences for Haiti
In order to promote stability in Haiti and to counterbalance the negative economic effects that political upheaval is having on Haiti, several proposals were made during the prior Congress to provide greater commercial opportunities to Haiti. The proposals were not acted upon during the last Congress and may be raised again this year. Both proposals from the prior Congress were named the Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity (HERO) Act.
- In 2003, S. 489 was introduced in the Senate by Senators DeWine (R-OH), Lugar (R-IN), Durbin (D-IL), Chafee (R-RI) and Nelson (D-FL), and former Senator Graham (D-FL) and H.R. 1031 was introduced in the House by Representatives Shaw (R-FL), Conyers (D-MI), Rangel (D-NY), and former Representative Crane (R-IL) and others. This legislation would amend the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act to provide duty-free treatment to certain articles from Haiti, including articles wholly assembled or knit-to-shape in Haiti using inputs from Haiti, the United States, an FTA partner with the United States or a beneficiary country, or where certain fabric or yarns are not commercially available in the United States. To qualify for these benefits, the President would have to review and certify that Haiti is meeting certain eligibility requirements.
- In 2003, the original cosponsors of S. 489, joined by Senators Voinovich (R-OH) and Sununu (R-NH), introduced S. 2261 to expand the benefits that would be provided to Haiti to make them more effective at achieving their objectives. In particular, this legislation would accord duty-free treatment for seven years to certain products of Haiti if the President certifies that Haiti has met the eligibility criteria. Apparel that would receive such treatment includes articles that are wholly assembled or knit-to-shape in Haiti from any combination of fabrics, fabric components, components knit-to-shape and yarns without regard to the country of origin of the fabrics, components, or yarns.
From a commercial perspective, it is extremely important that the benefits provided to Haiti at this critical time provide effective commercial benefits and do not unduly restrict commercial activities from resuming fully in Haiti. To that end, providing the flexibility contained in S. 2261 is very important. While this flexibility is important, it is also critical that provisions are included to ensure greater predictability of benefits for those producers which have a long-term and productive relationship in Haiti. Therefore, ECAT strongly supports including a “qualified industrial producer” (QIP) provision, based on relevant criteria that would permit duty-free entry for all qualifying imports from QIPs in Haiti. As well, ECAT strongly supports incorporating for Haiti the single transformation rules adopted in the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic FTA.
Legislation Expanding Trade Preferences with Least Developed Countries
In early 2005, companion legislation was introduced in the Senate (S. 191) by Senators Smith (R-OR), Santorum (R-PA), Baucus (D-MT) and Feinstein (D-CA) and in the House (H.R. 886) by Representatives Kolbe (R-AZ) and Crowley (D-NY) to provide trade preferences to 14 least developed countries (LDCs) and also to Sri Lanka. The LDCs are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Laos, Maldives, Nepal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timore-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Yemen. The legislation would provide duty-free benefits for textile and apparel products from these countries, similar to the preferences provided under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, discussed in section 13).
ECAT POSITION: ECAT welcomes legislation to expand trade and investment opportunities for U.S. farmers, manufacturers, service providers and their workers throughout the world and that will help promote economic development in the developing world.
Addressing Concerns about Trade and Investment Liberalization
Global Outsourcing
Global outsourcing has become an increasingly controversial issue in the political debate involving trade and investment liberalization. Critics argue that global outsourcing – the subcontracting or movement of business functions to offshore suppliers – has and will continue to cost significant jobs in the United States. Proposals have been made at the federal and state level to deny tax benefits or government contracts to companies that engage in outsourcing.
The upsurge in criticism ignores several fundamental facts, including that:
- Global outsourcing supports the growth of the U.S. economy, the competitiveness of U.S. companies and high living standards for Americans. Study-after-study has demonstrated that global activity by U.S. companies is not a zero-sum game that, as critics claim, results in losses for the U.S. economy or U.S. workers. Rather, the global activities of U.S. companies promote growth and opportunities at home:
Contributions of Global Engagement to the U.S. Economy and U.S. Workers |
For the last 20 years, American companies with global operations: |
- Accounted for over half of all U.S. research and development, capital investments and exports;
- Purchased more than 90 percent of their supplies (or intermediate inputs) from U.S.-based, not foreign suppliers, thereby supporting American producers and American jobs; and
- Paid higher wages to American workers than companies with purely domestic operations.
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| Source: Global Investments, American Returns (1998) and 1999 Update, by Dr. Matthew Slaughter, published by the Emergency Committee for American Trade |
Global activities of U.S. companies are also a primary driving force in the competitiveness and innovation of America’s information and communications technology sector, as documented in ECAT’s Mainstay IV: Technology, Trade and Investment: The Public Opinion Disconnect (2002). In short, American companies are stronger today and more competitive, supporting a high level of employment here at home, because of their global activities. Without such activity, the United States would likely have many fewer good, high-paying jobs than it does today.
- Insourcing and investment by foreign companies in the United States have a greater positive impact than the worst-case scenarios of outsourcing: Outsourcing criticism has largely ignored the impact of so-called insourcing, where foreign-owned companies invest and subcontract activities in the United States. Based on the most recent data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, majority-owned U.S. affiliates of foreign companies with operations in the United States employed 5.4 million U.S. workers in 2002, accounting for 5 percent of total U.S. employment in private industries. The Organization for International Investment reports that 6.4 million U.S. workers are employed by U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies. Of course, you can’t have insourcing and seek to block outsourcing at the same time. Other countries’ willingness to allow their companies to invest here in the United States simply will not continue if the legislative and other proposals being considered are adopted. In short, seeking to end outsourcing represents a very real threat to the 6.4 million U.S. workers who are employed by foreign companies.
- Outsourcing will have at most a small impact on U.S. jobs: Predictions of the severity of outsourcing ignore the fact that approximately 90 percent of U.S. jobs require goods and services to be provided locally. Efforts to connect outsourcing with the decline in manufacturing jobs in recent years have failed. In fact, most of the jobs lost in the U.S. economy in recent years have more to do with technological innovation than outsourcing or other trade- or investment-related developments. Even the most dire projections of lost jobs are actually negligible compared to the size of the overall economy and the 130 million existing jobs. The Forrester prediction of 3.3 million jobs lost over 15 years, for example, equals less than 2.5 percent of employed Americans. Obviously, the impact on these workers is very real and must be addressed – but through adjustment assistance, training and education.
- Legislative proposals that seek to limit outsourcing through the denial of tax benefits, government contracts and other provisions would undermine, rather than support, U.S. competitiveness and job growth. These proposals will make it more difficult for U.S. companies to compete in the global economy and will result in a loss of opportunities not only for U.S. companies in a wide range of sectors, but for U.S. workers as well.
- Legislation that will help educate America’s youth and help train and retrain its workers and provide adjustment assistance will do more to create the labor force that the United States needs to compete globally. While the United States cannot stop the global forces of innovation and the development of new technologies, it can do a better job of preparing U.S. workers to participate productively in the global economy. This requires full educational opportunities and preparation from early childhood onward through post-graduate work and into the workplace. There are roles for Federal, state and local government, institutions of learning, and the private sector in educating U.S. workers for success.
ECAT Studies
Over 30 years ago, the Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT) recognized the need to encourage greater awareness of the importance of the global activities of U.S. companies to the U.S. economy. At the time, American companies with global operations were under attack. Critics charged that U.S. foreign direct investment exported American jobs and promoted increased imports from foreign affiliates. Some political leaders advocated changing U.S. trade and tax laws to keep capital and production in the United States.
Starting in 1972, ECAT commissioned its first major study on the role of global activity on the domestic economy: The Multinational Corporation: American Mainstay in the World Economy. The report demonstrated that overseas investments by American companies contributed to increased U.S. exports and increased investments at home and became the first study in ECAT’s Mainstay series. In 1993, ECAT published its second Mainstay study: Mainstay II: A New Account of the Critical Role of U.S. Multinational Companies in the U.S. Economy. By using more extensive data coving the entire U.S. manufacturing sector during the decade of the 1980s, Mainstay II explored the effect of American companies operating overseas on the U.S. economy. The report concluded that to remain competitive and to participate successfully in global trade and investment, American companies must have a “global reach.”
More recently, ECAT has published two major studies as part of its Mainstay series that directly relate to much of the current debate about the domestic impact of the global activities of U.S. companies: Mainstay III: Global Investments, American Returns (1998 and 1999 Update) and Mainstay IV: Technology, Trade and Investment: The Public Opinion Disconnect (2003). These studies are summarized in section 6.
ECAT will actively continue its work to ensure that the public debate on these issues focuses on the facts of global sourcing and produces policies that will promote economic opportunities for Americans, not destroy them.
ECAT Position: With economic justification in study-after-study, ECAT strongly supports the global engagement of U.S. companies as a critical component to promoting economic growth and high living standards at home. Legislative proposals at the state or Federal level to restrict global engagement will undermine the strength of U.S. companies and the capacity of the U.S. economy to produce better, high-paying jobs in the United States. Legislation that will help educate America’s youth, help train and retrain its workers and provide adjustment assistance will do more to create the labor force that the United States needs to compete globally.
Temporary Entry Issues
Provisions have been included in U.S. trade and investment agreements since the 18th century to provide for the temporary entry of persons involved in trade and investment activities. From the United States’ original Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, the 38 U.S. bilateral investment treaties now in force to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore FTAs, U.S. negotiators and the U.S. Congress have long recognized the intersection between trade and investment on the one hand and the need to provide temporary access of company representatives and investors involved in those activities on the other. Such provisions, which have no impact on overall immigration policy – since they provide only temporary entry – promote economic activity in the United States by helping U.S. companies to expand their markets overseas.
Following negotiation and Congressional implementation of the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore FTAs, however, concerns were expressed by some Members of Congress on future efforts to negotiate such provisions as part of trade and/or investment agreements. As a result, there has been an effective moratorium on the Administration’s ability to negotiate even minimal temporary entry provisions for investors, such as those already authorized by U.S. immigration law for E visas for BIT investors, or moderate expansions of the H1-B visa provisions for FTAs partners, let alone the so-called Mode 4 commitments (temporary entry) that are critical to the ongoing WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiations on services.
Efforts to increase U.S. security in recent years have also resulted in new restrictions on business, as well as student, visas, including more limited time periods for visitors to stay in the United States and greater requirements for the issuance of visas.
Snapshot on the Importance of Temporary Entry for the U.S. Services Industry |
The effective moratorium on the negotiation of temporary entry issues in trade agreements has an enormously negative effect on the U.S. services industry, which accounts for approximately 65 percent of the U.S. economy. While currently the most competitive services industry in the world, the U.S. services industry faces enormous challenges: |
- Impediment to Growth and Competitiveness of U.S. Service Suppliers. Close to a third of the U.S. services surplus results from services that require U.S. business people to travel abroad to begin or perform services contracts. Without the ability to negotiate improved temporary entry provisions with trading partners in new FTAs, let alone BITs, the entry of Americans traveling abroad is oftentimes restricted or unduly delayed in a manner that undermines the competitiveness of one of America’s strongest industries.
- Impediment to the Elimination of Foreign Service Barriers. Nowhere is the stalemate on temporary entry more critical than the services negotiations in the WTO Doha Development Agenda, where foreign countries increasingly are seeking clearer, more efficient and expansive temporary entry provisions in exchange for the dismantling of their much more extensive services barriers.
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While security concerns are obviously critical, it is also extremely important that U.S. temporary entry policies reflect U.S. economic interests, which include the need for U.S. companies to send their personnel on a temporary basis abroad and to bring in their foreign employees on a temporary basis into the United States. Ongoing delays in the U.S. visa process and significant restrictions in the number of H1-B visas permitted each year, as well as foreign barriers to Americans’ temporary entry abroad represent a growing problem for the ability of U.S. companies to expand and efficiently operate their operations in a manner that promotes economic growth here in the United States. It has become a major impediment to progress in the WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiations as well, and continues to limit U.S. negotiators in FTA and BIT negotiations.
ECAT Position: ECAT strongly urges U.S. trade negotiators, Members of Congress and the business community to expand their efforts to resolve the longstanding stalemate in the treatment of temporary entry in trade and investment negotiations. The existing moratorium on the inclusion of temporary entry provisions in trade and investment agreements undermines the competitiveness of U.S. companies and the ability of U.S. negotiators to secure the elimination of other countries’ barriers to services and investment
Labor and Environment Issues
The relationship between trade liberalization and labor is a complex one that goes far beyond the narrow debate about whether labor standards should be enforceable through trade sanctions. What is oftentimes lost in the discussion is the positive role that trade plays in raising living standards and, therefore, labor and environmental standards worldwide. As the World Bank and others have documented, increased economic growth and a growing middle class enable and increasingly motivate developing countries to improve labor and environmental standards. Since World War II, the liberalization of trade has produced a six-fold growth in the world economy and a tripling of per capita income and enabled hundreds of millions of families to escape from poverty and enjoy higher living standards.
A study by Dartmouth College economists Eric Edmonds and
Nina Pavnick, “Does Globalization Increase Child Labor,” also documents this conclusion with regard to labor standards. This study found that the removal of some of Vietnam’s trade barriers – export quotas on rice – decreased child labor because parents were able to earn more money from their rice crops. As efforts continue to link trade and labor and environmental issues, it is critical that the positive relationship between trade liberalization and labor and environmental standards be recognized and incorporated into this policy debate. Proposals that would impede trade liberalization and
economic growth must, therefore, be seriously questioned.
For the most part, labor and environmental issues may be better addressed directly through separate agendas in organizations with technical expertise, rather than as add-ons to the trade agenda. Efforts in the International Labor Organization, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the North American Development Bank and other organizations, for example, can be intensified. And, in those cases where complementarity between U.S. trade and U.S. labor and/or U.S. environmental objectives exists, efforts should be made to address these objectives jointly and in a cooperative manner. We review below the major trade-related labor and environmental efforts, with the exception of the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) that is discussed in section 2 and NAFTA-related issues that are addressed in section 11.
Labor Issues
Trade Promotion Authority and Free Trade Agreements
As discussed in section 4, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act (TPA Act), enacted as part of the Trade Act of 2002, includes wide-ranging negotiating objectives. With respect to labor issues, the TPA Act includes the most extensive labor negotiating objectives ever included in a trade-negotiating authority law. The principal provisions include:
- Overall negotiating objectives to:
- foster economic growth, raise living standards, and promote full employment in the United States and to enhance the global economy;
- promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent with core labor standards of the International Labor Organization (as defined in section 2113(2)) and an understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights; and
- seek provisions in trade agreements under which parties to those agreements strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the protections afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as an encouragement for trade.
- Principal negotiating objectives to:
- ensure that parties to any trade agreement do not fail to enforce effectively their labor laws through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade;
- strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards (as defined in section 2113(2));
- ensure that the labor, health, or safety policies and practices of the parties to trade agreements with the United States do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against United States exports or serve as disguised barriers to trade;
- prevent distortions in the conduct of international trade caused by the use of the worst forms of child labor, in whole or in part, in the production of goods for export in international commerce; and
- redress unfair and illegitimate competition based upon the use of the worst forms of child labor, in whole or in part, in the production of goods for export in international commerce.
- Requirements for the Administration to:
- promote greater cooperation between the WTO and ILO (Uruguay Round Act provides ongoing requirement for the Administration to seek a working group on trade and labor at the WTO);
- seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards;
- have the Secretary of Labor consult with any country seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning that country's labor laws and provide technical assistance to that country if needed;
- submit to the Ways and Means and Finance Committees a meaningful labor rights report of the country, or countries, with respect to which the President is negotiating;
- review the impact of future trade agreements on U.S. employment, modeled after Executive Order 13141; and
- report on child labor laws for each country with which the President seeks a negotiation.
In addition, TPA includes an enforcement negotiating objective directing U.S. negotiators to seek to treat all principal negotiating objectives equally, and would give the flexibility to determine the mechanism that will most effectively encourage compliance.
Provisions reflecting the TPA objectives were included in recent FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, the CAFTA-DR and Bahrain. These provisions build upon the provisions of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, providing – unlike the Jordan FTA – binding dispute settlement subject to strict time limits.
WTO Activities
At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, the WTO agreed to the following statement on labor issues:
“We reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference regarding internationally recognized core labour standards. We take note of work under way in the International Labour Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of globalization.”
Efforts by the European Union (EU) and the United States to promote a more activist WTO role, either through the formation of a WTO Forum on labor or to “support” the work of the ILO, were rejected overwhelmingly by the developing countries on the grounds that linking labor issues to trade agreements could lead to disguised restrictions on trade and that the ILO is the appropriate forum to deal with labor issues.
International Labor Organization Activities
Over the past several years, there has been substantial progress in developing a greater consensus on labor standards in the International Labor Organization (ILO). Since 1998, the ILO began a major push for country ratifications of the core conventions. The eight core conventions are:
No. 29, Forced Labor, 1930;
No. 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, 1948;
No. 98, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, 1949;
No. 100, Equal Remuneration, 1951;
No. 105, Abolition of Forced Labor, 1957;
No. 111, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), 1958;
No. 138, Minimum Age Convention, 1973; and
No. 182, Worst Forms of Child Labor (1999).
In 1998, the ILO also adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work to promote the observance of basic labor rights, with a follow-up mechanism to promote countries’ compliance with these labor principles. From 1999 on-ward, the ILO has published annual studies on countries’ overall compliance with the core ILO principles and conventions.
In 1999, the ILO adopted a new convention, No. 182, banning the worst forms of child labor. The United States became the second country to ratify this convention, which had 115 ratifications by February 2002. Congress also directed the Department of Labor to prepare a report on international child labor, including the feasibility of efforts to reduce by 50 percent the number of children engaged in the worst forms of child labor.
The United States has ratified only Convention No. 105 on forced labor and No. 182 on the worst forms of child labor; it has agreed to observe all of the core principles as part of the 1998 Declaration.
The United States remains a significant donor to the ILO’s International Programme to Eliminate Child Labor (IPEC) (established in 1992), which seeks to take children out of unhealthy work environments and place them in schools. Under the IPEC program, thousands of children are being given educational opportunities and phased out of garment factories in Bangladesh, the soccer ball industry in Pakistan, and fireworks production in Guatemala. Since 1995, the United States has contributed over $202 million to support 120 projects in 61 countries.
In FY 2001, the United State began efforts to promote a new education initiative to improve access to quality education in areas with a high incidence of child labor. The United States committed $30 million in FY 2003 pursuant to this program.
In November 2000, the ILO Governing Body, for the first time ever, allowed measures to go forward to compel a country, the Government of Myanmar (Burma), to eliminate forced labor. As a result of an inquiry initiated under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, the ILO has been reviewing whether Myanmar is complying with its obligations under the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29) that Myanmar ratified in 1955. An ILO technical cooperation mission in October 2000 found that despite prior recommendations, Myanmar continued to violate the Convention through the “pervasive use of forced labor imposed by the authorities and the military.” As a result, the Governing Body permitted implementation of an ILO Conference resolution requiring an ongoing review of Myanmar’s activities and recommending that Member Countries review their relations with Myanmar and “take appropriate measures to ensure that such relations do not perpetuate or extend the system of forced or compulsory labor in that country.” The ILO also recommended a review of whether the ILO, United Nations or United Nations Economic and Social Council should cease any activities in Myanmar. Article 33 which establishes a process for reviewing countries’ compliance with ratified conventions had been used little prior to this point and had never resulted in recommendations for action as was issued with respect to Myanmar.
The ILO also remains involved in reviewing Cambodia’s labor practices as part of the U.S.-Cambodian textile agreement discussed below.
Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930
The United States has stepped up U.S. Customs Service enforcement of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which bans the importation of goods, made from forced or indentured labor. On June 12, 1999, then President Clinton issued Executive Order 13126 ("Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor") to prevent federal agencies from buying products that have been made with forced or indentured child labor. Under procurement regulations implementing the Executive Order, federal contractors who supply products on a list published by the Department of Labor must certify that they have made a good faith effort to determine whether forced or indentured child labor was used to produce the items. On January 18, 2001, the Department of Labor, in consultation and cooperation with the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State, developed the list of products, identified by country of origin, which they believe might have been made with forced or indentured child labor. The list is updated periodically.
Generalized System of Preferences and Other Preference Programs
U.S. trade preference programs, including the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act all include eligibility requirements that consider whether a country has taken steps or is working towards respect for core labor principles. The Trade and Development Act of 2000, enacted on May 18, 2000, added a new eligibility requirement to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program (and, as a result, to the sub-Saharan African (SSA) program) and to the expanded Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) program that focuses on whether a country has “implemented its commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.” This statute also added a general eligibility provision on worker rights to the expanded CBI program. In determining country eligibility under both the SSA and CBI programs, USTR considered these factors as required and was able to seek greater labor rights protections in several countries. The Administration reviews annually petitions from interested parties as to whether a GSP beneficiary is not meeting its eligibility requirements, including with respect to labor rights.
U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement
The United States and Cambodia signed a three-year bilateral textile agreement on January 21, 1999, that established base quota levels for Cambodian textile and apparel products. For the first time ever, the agreement allowed for an annual quota increase, up to 14 percent in the base quota levels (on top of the traditional six-percent annual growth rate), pending an annual U.S. determination on whether worker rights in Cambodian textile and apparel factories “substantially comply” with Cambodian labor laws and internationally recognized core labor standards.
In December 2001, the United States and Cambodia agreed to extend the agreement by three years (until December 31, 2004) in a memorandum of understanding that opens most textile trade between the two countries. The Memorandum of Understanding increases Cambodia's quota for textile imports by nine percent, in addition to a six-percent increase that is normal for most textile import quotas – a total increase of 15 percent. The nine-percent increase for 2002 reflects Cambodia's progress towards ensuring that working conditions in its garment sector are in "substantial compliance" with internationally recognized labor standards and provisions of Cambodia's labor law.
While textile and apparel trade between the United States and Cambodia has increased substantially since this agreement was signed, several suggestions have been made with regard to its improvement. In particular, it would be useful and effective to develop a clearer and more concrete definition of what “substantial compliance” means (e.g., should factories that do not ship to the United States be included) and better implementation of the quota bonus (to ensure that those factories in compliance receive the benefit and those that are not in compliance do not). Additionally, greater transparency is required, and Cambodia should be given the possibility of asking for a review of an initial finding of noncompliance.
Environmental Issues
Trade Promotion Authority and Free Trade Agreements
As discussed in section 4, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act (TPA Act), enacted as part of the Trade Act of 2002, includes wide-ranging negotiating objectives. With respect to environmental issues, the TPA Act includes – for the first time ever in a trade-negotiating authority law – provisions related to trade and the environment. The principal provisions include:
- Overall negotiating objectives to:
- ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the environment and enhance the international means of doing so, while optimizing the use of the world's resources; and
- seek provisions in trade agreements under which parties to those agreements strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws as an encouragement for trade.
- Principal negotiating objectives to:
- ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United States does not fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade;
- strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to protect the environment through the promotion of sustainable development;
- reduce or eliminate government practices or policies that unduly threaten sustainable development;
- seek market access, through the elimination of tariffs and nontariff barriers, for United States environmental technologies, goods, and services; and
- ensure that environmental, health, or safety policies and practices of the parties to trade agreements with the United States do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against United States exports or serve as disguised barriers to trade.
- Requirements for the Administration to:
- seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to develop and implement standards for the protection of the environment and human health based on sound science;
- conduct environmental reviews of future trade and investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141; and
- continue to promote consideration of multilateral environmental agreements and consult with parties to such agreements regarding the consistency of any such agreement that includes trade measures with existing environmental exceptions under Article XX of the GATT 1994.
In addition, the TPA Act includes an enforcement negotiating objective directing U.S. negotiators to seek to treat all principal negotiating objectives equally, and would give the flexibility to determine the mechanism that will most effectively encourage compliance.
As discussed above with respect to labor, environmental provisions meeting these objectives were included in recent FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, CAFTA-DR and Bahrain. The CAFTA-DR also includes a citizen complaint procedure, allowing non-governmental organizations to raise complaints that a country is not enforcing its environmental laws. USTR also issued a capacity-building grant of $500,000 to the U.S. Humane Society in October 2003 to promote environmentally sustainable and humane agriculture and the protection of wildlife and habitat in Central America.
WTO Activities
The multilateral trading system recognizes the importance of environmental protection as reflected in the WTO Preamble which makes the promotion of sustainable development a key objective and in the numerous exceptions provided to WTO obligations allowing for the enforcement of environmental, health, and safety measures. In 1994, WTO member states agreed to establish the Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE) to try to address many of the environment-trade issues that have arisen. In March 1999, the WTO held a high-level symposium to discuss such issues further. In November 1999, the WTO announced that it had entered into a cooperative agreement with the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to help build awareness of the important link between trade, environment, and sustainable development in developing countries.
At the 2001 Doha Ministerial, WTO members agreed to new negotiations on environmental issues as part of the Doha Development Agenda. In particular, the Doha Declaration provides for new negotiations on:
“(i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The negotiations shall be limited in scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question. The negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party to the MEA in question;
(ii) procedures for regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for the granting of observer status; and
(iii) the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services.”
In addition, the Declaration directed the Committee on Trade and Environment to focus particular attention on the following issues, with an instruction to identify whether there needs to be any clarification of WTO rules or new negotiations at the Fifth Ministerial Conference:
(i) the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to developing countries, in particular the least-developed among them, and those situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit trade, the environment and development;
(ii) the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and
(iii) labeling requirements for environmental purposes.
The Declaration also recognized the importance of technical assistance and capacity building and encourages information sharing with respect to environmental reviews at the national level. WTO work on these issues is discussed in more depth in sections 2 and 6.
The WTO dispute-settlement process also has maintained a core respect for environmental protection and conservation. WTO challenges to U.S. environmental policies have been rare, arising to date in only two out of a total of 96 dispute settlement cases involving the United States. In each of these cases, the final WTO dispute settlement panel or Appellate Body report did not question the soundness of the U.S. laws being challenged or the right of the United States to enforce those laws.
In the first WTO case involving a U.S. environmental law, a WTO panel found that a part of the regulations implementing the Clean Air Act pertaining to foreign refineries was applied in a discriminatory manner. In response, the Environmental Protection Agency eliminated the discriminatory aspect of its regulations without undermining the enforcement of the Clean Air Act. Similarly, in the second case involving a U.S. environmental law, a WTO panel found that the application of U.S. law requiring turtle-excluder devices on nets used by shrimping boats to Asian countries was discriminatory, but the panel did not question the validity of the law itself as an appropriate exception to WTO rules under Article XX of the 1994 GATT. The United States responded to this decision by expanding technical assistance to other countries to encourage compliance with the law and increased efforts to resolve the issue through a multilateral agreement. In October 2000, Malaysia challenged the United States’ implementation of this matter, which the WTO Dispute Settlement Body referred to the original panel. In October 2001, the Appellate Body found that the United States’ implementation of this law was fully consistent with WTO rules and complied with the earlier Appellate Body recommendations. In a third important environmental case at the WTO, not involving the United States, a WTO panel upheld France’s ban on imports of asbestos as justified under GATT Article XX as necessary to protect human health or the environment. Canada appealed this decision to the Appellate Body, which upheld the panel’s finding in March 2001.
The United States is also promoting trade and environmental protection in mutually supportive ways by promoting trade liberalization objectives that will contribute to a cleaner environment. For example, the United States is seeking an agreement to eliminate barriers to trade in environmental goods in the Doha Development Agenda, end tariffs on energy equipment and scientific instruments, and eliminate fishery subsidies. These measures would both facilitate environmental protection abroad and create new U.S. export opportunities.
Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements
Following up on the 1999 Executive Order 13141 directing USTR to conduct environmental reviews of certain trade agreements, USTR and the Council on Environmental Quality issued Guidelines for the Implementation of Executive Order 13141 in December 2000. These guidelines are intended to identify “reasonably foreseeable impacts of trade agreements (both positive and negative),” as well as the “complementarities between trade and environmental objectives.”
Foreign Assistance
The United States continues to be the largest donor to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) that helps developing countries mitigate environmental problems with a potential global impact through the funding of projects that relate to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, ozone layer, land degradation and persistent organic pollutants. In the FY 2006, the budget proposes $107.5 million for the fourth installment of the U.S. pledge of $500 million.
Food Trade Issues
Unsubstantiated concerns about the safety of Genetically Modified Organisms and hormone-fed beef and implementation of the Biosafety Protocol will remain major issues this year.
Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Organisms
Fueled by food-safety scares over “mad cow” disease and other cases involving contamination of animal feed, public opposition to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is widespread in Europe, has extended to Asian and African countries and to a much more limited extent in the United States. At the same time, the need for and use of GMO crops is spreading worldwide. Genetically engineered crops have higher yields and reduce farmers’ dependence on pesticides. By increasing productivity, bioengineered crops have the potential to ensure food security and to reduce hunger worldwide. Biotech crops have also been developed that reduce demands on scarce water resources, that provide additional nutritional benefits (i.e., golden rice which adds beta-carotene to rice), and that can lower labor demand.
Despite these benefits, some groups have argued that GMOs present potential ecological hazards, citing studies that suggest that genetically engineered crops may harm monarch butterflies and other beneficial insects. Subsequent studies have shown, however, that the effect of GMOs on monarch butterflies is no different than that of non-GMO agricultural practices.
Since 1998, producers have sought EU approvals on over 30 varieties of GMOs. The EU’s effective moratorium on granting approvals was lifted briefly in 2004, when it granted approval for two U.S. biotech varieties -- Bt11 sweet corn for human consumption and NK603 corn for uses as animal feed and processing. Remaining requests have been outstanding for approximately six years. Despite the EU’s approval of a few GMO varieties, several countries – Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Greece and Luxembourg – have established marketing bans.
On May 13, 2003, the United States filed a WTO consultation request with respect to the EU's moratorium on all new biotech approvals, and the bans that six EU member states (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg) have in place on certain biotech products previously approved by the EU. A panel was established on August 29, 2003. On April 8, 2004, the Panel rejected EU claims that the United States had failed to adequately state its claim against the EU. The case is still pending.
In July 25, 2001, the EU Commission issued directive 2001/18 on pre-marketing approvals of GMOs and their release into the environment, which sets up traceability and labeling requirements for food and feed. In November 2002, EU agriculture ministers reached a compromise on tolerance levels, allowing up to 0.9 percent of a product to be derived from approved genetically modified crops without facing mandatory labeling requirements. While the United States pushed for significant changes to the directive before its issuance, the changes made by the EU are insufficient and the final directive poses serious problems for U.S. agriculture producers and farmers. In particular, the food labeling requirements are onerous and a serious trade barrier. While the regulation does not appear to require precise traceability for raw materials for food, feed and processing, it is unclear how this proposal will be implemented. As well, these proposals are of questionable compatibility with the WTO Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the underlying GATT agreement. The United States is currently evaluating these measures.
Beyond the EU, Japan and Korea have passed mandatory GMO labeling laws over the opposition of the United States, which has urged countries not to enact labeling laws on the grounds that they could be applied inconsistently and create major new trade barriers. Zambia and other Southern African countries have also refused U.S. food aid because it may contain GM products. The United States has argued that GMO labeling issues should be dealt with under the WTO Agreement on SPS Measures, which permits SPS restrictions to be placed on imports only when enough scientific evidence exists to justify the restrictions. The EU and certain developing countries argue in response that the SPS Agreement allows the use of the so-called “precautionary principle,” permitting restriction of genetically modified foods in certain circumstances, based on environmental or health concerns, even if the science behind the concerns remained uncertain.
The United States is also concerned about GMO regulations introduced by China’s Ministry of Agriculture and State Administration for Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine concerning the requirement for obtaining permanent safety certificates for GMO products such as soybeans, corn and canola under China’s biotechnology regulations and the more recent requirement to obtain import permits for these commodity shipments into China. While industry is currently operating under temporary or “interim” safety certificates and applying for necessary import permits on the basis of these certificates, the approval process for import permits is slow and permanent safety certificates have yet to be issued by the Chinese government. In addition, the United States is also concerned about recent Chinese testing of GMO products before their approval. The United States is in consultations with China to ensure that these regulations do not disrupt trade in GMOs, particularly soybeans, which represent the predominate U.S. exports of GMO crops to China.
Biosafety Protocol
In January 2000, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was negotiated under the framework of the 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), to which the United States is not a party. This represents the first international agreement regulating trade in GMOs. The Protocol was signed in May 2000 and will only go into effect after 50 countries have ratified it. Because the United States has not ratified the CBD, the United States only had “observer” status at the negotiations and worked through the so-called “Miami group” of agricultural allies (e.g., Canada, Australia, and Argentina). The United States must adhere to trade rules imposed by countries signing the Protocol, but as a non-CBD ratifier, does not have to implement the Protocol.
The Protocol requires exporters to obtain advance approval from the importing country, in the form of advance informed agreements (AIA), for initial shipments of GMOs intended for release into the environment (i.e., seeds, microbes, or fish to be put in a river) and requires the labeling of GMOs that are intended for use as food or animal feed, or for processing. The agreement does not apply to agricultural commodities to be used for food, feed, or processing. It requires that risk assessments of GMOs be carried out in a scientifically sound manner. The protocol notes that “trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable development.” It also contains a savings clause to preserve countries’ existing rights and obligations under other international agreements such as the WTO; in other words, the Protocol is not to be interpreted as changing any rights. The Protocol will be reviewed five years after its entry into force, and at least every five years thereafter.
The exact impact of the Protocol upon international trade is unknown and will depend upon how the Protocol is interpreted and implemented by each ratifying country. While rules must adequately address the preservation of global biodiversity, we must also ensure we do not impose unnecessary costs or barriers in order to preserve a low-cost bulk handling system to transport the world’s commodities.
EU Beef-Hormone Case
In July 1999, the United States imposed 100 percent retaliatory tariffs on roughly $117 million worth of U.S. imports from the EU in response to the EU’s failure to comply with a WTO dispute panel ruling requiring the removal of its ban on imports of hormone-fed beef from the United States. The WTO panel ruled that the EU has failed to demonstrate that U.S. hormone-fed beef causes health risks. Congressional frustration over the EU’s refusal to lift its ban on hormone-fed beef prompted the introduction and passage (as part of the Trade and Development Act of 2000) of the carousel retaliation provision requiring the periodic modification of the products targeted for retaliation in both the beef and bananas case. This provision is discussed in more detail in section 5.
Since the imposition of rebalancing tariffs, U.S. and EU negotiators have discussed various proposals for resolving this dispute by expanding the quota for U.S. hormone-free beef. Negotiators have been unable to reach an agreement that would substantially compensate U.S. beef producers. The EU indicated in 2003 that it was preparing to make the ban on the hormone oestradiol permanent.
ECAT’s Food Chain Coalition Proposal
One of the ways ECAT is supporting efforts to address the human side of trade liberalization is through its Food Chain Coalition proposal that was presented to WTO member countries during the Seattle WTO ministerial. The Food Chain proposal is intended to (1) provide a framework for trade liberalization in terms of meeting human needs; and (2) create greater leverage in pursuing market access and other trade liberalization goals by creating a cross-sectoral alliance of interests organized around eliminating barriers to food trade.
Removal of barriers to food trade provides one of the clearest examples of the importance of trade liberalization in meeting basic human needs. Population increases, rising standards of living, and growing urbanization around the world are producing dramatic increases in the demand for food. This rising demand for food presents tremendous global market opportunities in the broad array of sectors involved in producing and handling food on its journey from the farm to the table. In addition to farmers, seed companies, agro-chemical firms, grain handlers and processors, manufacturers of farm machinery, food manufacturers, retailers, financial services companies, insurers, and transportation firms benefit directly from a global increase in food demand. Indirectly, all businesses gain because meeting food demand at lower costs allows a greater amount of discretionary income to be spent on other goods and services.
The Food Chain proposal can provide a new approach to gaining enhanced leverage in negotiations on agriculture, services, and other areas by using the elimination of barriers at all levels of the food chain as an organizing principle. Based on this principle, the Coalition seeks to create cross-sectoral alliances in support of common negotiating priorities such as tariff liberalization, elimination of restrictions on investment and distribution, customs facilitation, and prohibitions on the use of unilateral food sanctions. Placing these issues in the context of the food chain can also create the means to avoid existing roadblocks between developed and developing member countries, as well as between the United States and the EU, particularly as WTO efforts continue on the built-in negotiations on agriculture and services.
ECAT’s Food Chain proposal is not intended as a substitute for discrete negotiating groups on agriculture, services, and other areas. Instead, it is intended as a way to enhance the chances for overall liberalization by establishing the elimination of barriers to food trade, at all levels from production to distribution, as an overall negotiating objective and calling for the adoption of a review mechanism to monitor achievement of this objective.
Health Policy and Intellectual Property Rights Protection
There have been increasing attempts in recent years to weaken the application of U.S. and multilateral intellectual property rights provisions with respect to certain pharmaceutical products, particularly those used in the treatment of HIV-AIDS. In particular, some developing countries, private organizations and charities, and some Members of Congress have sharply criticized attempts by the United States to promote intellectual property rights protection involving pharmaceuticals used in the treatment of HIV-AIDS, arguing that health policy concerns justify the weakening of intellectual property rights protections.
There is no question that the HIV-AIDS crisis has reached monumental proportions in sub-Saharan Africa and that the virus continues to spread in other regions. Over 34 million people living in sub-Saharan Africa have contracted HIV-AIDS and, of these, over 12 million people have died. HIV-AIDS-related deaths in sub-Saharan Africa represent 83 percent of worldwide HIV-AIDS-related deaths.
As with each of the issues discussed above, efforts must continue to identify the sources of and best solutions for addressing this crisis. It is important to understand, therefore, that drug prices are not the single or perhaps even most important issue in handling this crisis. Many reports have documented that problems of infrastructure (including the lack of medical health professionals and clinics), along with other social and governmental barriers, represent substantial problems in treating and preventing HIV-AIDS in developing countries.
In an effort to address concerns over the price of HIV-AIDS-related pharmaceuticals being sold in developing countries, several major U.S. and European pharmaceutical companies, particularly those that make anti-retroviral drugs, have developed initiatives to donate or provide at very low prices such products to developing countries. These companies are also involved in other efforts to support infrastructure development and treatment and prevention efforts in these countries.
In May 2000, the Clinton Administration issued Executive Order No. 13155 providing that the United States “shall not seek, through negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or revision of any intellectual property law or policy of a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country, as determined by the President, that regulates HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies” if the law or policy of the country promotes access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals and provides adequate and effective intellectual property protection consistent with the TRIPS agreement. If found to be applicable, this provision appears to allow both compulsory licensing (where non-patent holders are licensed to manufacture a patented pharmaceutical) and parallel imports (where the country permits imports from entities other than those authorized by the original patent-holder). While technically applicable only to sub-Saharan African countries, the Clinton Administration indicated that they would consider requests for similar treatment from other countries on a case-by-case basis. In February 2001, Bush Administration officials indicated that they were prepared to maintain the Executive Order.
At the WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, WTO countries agreed on a Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. In particular, the declaration reaffirmed countries’ commitment to implement the TRIPS Agreement, while emphasizing that interpretations of TRIPS should be supportive of measures meant to protect public health. In particular, the declaration states that:
“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”
The declaration also clarifies that countries have the right to use compulsory licensing and to define what is a national health emergency. As well, the declaration instructs the TRIPS Council to examine the issue of compulsory licensing in countries with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities and to report to the General Council at the end of 2002. Efforts to reach consensus language on the scope of permissible compulsory licensing by that deadline resulted in deadlock, as developing countries sought an open-ended definition of diseases that could give rise to compulsory licensing and the United States sought to use a more limited definition -- HIV/AIDS, malaria or tuberculosis or other infectious epidemics of comparable scale and gravity. In late December 2002, the United States indicated that it would unilaterally impose a moratorium on proceeding with WTO dispute settlement in certain cases involving compulsory licensing.
On August 30, 2003, the WTO General Council approved the Decision on the “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” along with the text of a statement describing members “shared understanding” of how the Decision should be interpreted. The Decision provides for the waiver of TRIPS Article 31(f) to allow countries producing generic medicines under compulsory licenses to export the medicines to eligible countries. The accompanying statement makes clear that the provision should be used in good faith for health policy reasons, not commercial or industrial policy. This Decision is to remain operative until an amendment to the TRIPS is adopted.
ECAT strongly supports efforts to promote effective solutions to address the HIV-AIDS and other disease emergencies in Africa and elsewhere. ECAT is concerned, however, that too much emphasis is being placed on intellectual property rights protections and the perceived link to drug prices as the main problem, when it is precisely intellectual property rights protections that foster the development of the pharmaceuticals necessary to treat and, one day, cure and prevent these diseases. A 2004 analysis – How Do Patents and Economic Policies Affect Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries, by Amir Attaran, Health Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3, found that “[p]atents cannot cause essential medicines to be inaccessible in ‘many’ developing countries because they do not exist 98.6 percent of the time.” Rather, increased efforts are needed to promote infrastructure development and other solutions that will help stem this crisis. In particular, U.S. and other developed nations must increase foreign assistance, including debt relief, to developing countries so that they can finance much needed improvements in public health, education, and other social programs. ECAT believes U.S. businesses receive insufficient recognition for their efforts in helping developing countries to tackle these issues. ECAT supports efforts as well that will ensure that modifications to intellectual property rights protection are only permitted for public health emergencies and do not result in diversion.
Transparency
The United States and the WTO have taken steps to allow greater participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in trade policy discussions. The WTO has sponsored a series of NGO forums on labor and environment issues, as well as held a daylong seminar for NGOs in Seattle just prior to the opening of the WTO ministerial meeting.
As part of the “Civil Society” initiative, the United States proposed a number of changes to WTO procedures to create greater transparency, including earlier release of documents and decisions, improved consultative procedures, the opportunity to file amicus briefs in dispute settlement proceedings, and the opening of panel proceedings to the public. The United States has proposed similar transparency measures in the FTAA negotiations. The United States also initiated a consultation process with NGOs and other interested parties to develop procedures for broadening the opportunity for NGO input in the trade policy advisory process.
ECAT POSITION: Continued global trade expansion is the bedrock of progress in achieving greater international observance of high labor and environmental standards and in promoting better access to food and health care. Progress on the human side of trade requires that the United States continue its leadership in the multilateral trading system promoting a strong set of WTO rules based on the right of member countries to set and enforce high environmental, labor, or other domestic standards. Before rushing to adopt trade-oriented solutions that may not be effective, it is critical that policymakers first work to define the United States’ objectives in each of these areas, and then determine how those objectives can best be achieved. Many of these issues may be better addressed directly through separate agendas in organizations with technical expertise, rather than as add-ons to the trade agenda. And, in those cases where complementarity between U.S. trade and other U.S. objectives exists, efforts should be made to address these objectives jointly and in a cooperative manner.
Trade Remedy Law Issues
Attention will also continue to be focused in 2005 on a variety of trade remedy issues, including WTO negotiations and dispute settlement cases involving these rules. While prior years have witnessed numerous pieces of legislation to modify the trade remedy laws, no significant proposals have been made this Congress as of the end of March 2005.
If Congress considers modifying U.S. trade remedy laws in 2005, ECAT urges that consideration be given to the balance that these laws need to achieve between the interests of the industry seeking relief and other U.S. industries and consumers. Prior proposals to modify the causation and injury standards of section 201 and some of the proposals to amend the antidumping and countervailing duty laws would not establish that balance, but instead tilt the relief standard overwhelmingly in favor of the petitioning domestic industry. Such a result is not in the interest of the United States as a whole. Furthermore, many of these provisions are contrary to U.S. international commitments.
ECAT strongly urges that any modifications to U.S. law be consistent with U.S. international obligations in the WTO, the NAFTA and other trade agreements. As described below, U.S. trade remedy provisions and decisions have already been the subject of numerous challenges in the WTO. The enactment of WTO-inconsistent provisions, as has been proposed in the past two years, undermines U.S. leadership in the world trading system and our ability to convince other countries to honor their commitments. It also undermines U.S. competitiveness and subjects U.S. exporters to the risk of retaliation.
WTO Dispute Settlement Cases Involving U.S. Trade Remedy Laws
U.S. trading partners have sought several reviews of U.S. trade remedy provisions since binding dispute settlement provisions were adopted with the establishment of the WTO in 1995. Other countries, particularly the EU, have similarly seen a significant number of WTO trade remedy-related cases.
In 2004, the U.S. Congress repealed the Antidumping Act of 1916 through section 2006 of the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004. (WTO dispute settlement panels had found the Antidumping Act inconsistent with existing U.S. commitments). Several other decisions warrant consideration and legislative action in 2005.
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (“Byrd Amendment”)
Senator Byrd (D-WV) successfully attached an amendment, the “Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act,” (CDSOA) to the FY 2002 agriculture appropriations bill approved in October 2000. This provision requires that antidumping and countervailing duties be distributed to affected domestic producers who supported the antidumping and countervailing duty actions in the first place, rather than deposited in the general treasury. Eleven parties -- the EU, Mexico, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Canada India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand -- sought WTO dispute settlement consultations with the United States arguing that the legislation violates several WTO provisions.
In September 2002, the panel reviewing the case found that the CDSOA is an impermissible action against dumping and subsidies under the WTO Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements, respectively, because it is a remedy in addition to what is already authorized under those agreements. The Appellate Body agreed with the panel in January 2003 and an arbitrator found that the United States had until December 27, 2003 to bring its laws into conformity. In January 2004, eight of the complaining parties requested the right to retaliate, while three (Australia, Indonesia and Thailand) agreed to extend for a year the period for which the United States was to bring itself into compliance. On August 31, 2004, WTO arbitrators determined the acceptable level of retaliation (0.7 times the amount of disbursements) on a yearly basis. The EU and Canada are developing retaliation lists.
The United States has stated its intention to implement the DSB recommendations and rulings. The FY 2004, 2005 and 2006 budgets each proposed the repeal of the CDSOA. Representatives Ramstad (R-MN) and Shaw (R-FL) introduced H.R. 1121 to repeal the CDSOA in its entirety. In 2003, Senator Snowe (R-ME) and others introduced an innovative approach in S.1299 to bring the CDSOA into conformity with WTO obligations (and provide community assistance as discussed under the trade adjustment assistance section below).
ECAT strongly opposed enactment of the CDSOA because it undercuts U.S. leadership in the global trading system and is inconsistent with U.S. trade obligations. As well, it sets a precedent that we do not want other countries to follow by increasing the incentives for filing antidumping and countervailing duty cases. Through this provision, domestic companies that are successful in having antidumping and/or countervailing duties imposed on foreign competitors, receive a cash reward for their success. This is not in the interest of U.S. exporters who may face similar laws abroad.
Notably, the adoption of the CDSOA helped to guarantee that the WTO antidumping and countervailing duty agreements are once again on the table in the next round of trade negotiations, diverting us from our broader trade and investment objectives.
A much better use of these duties would be to distribute them to adjustment assistance or similar programs. Redirecting the money to workers, rather than providing it as a windfall to a select group of companies, would at least be helpful in promoting the consensus that we need to build in this country for our broader trade and investment liberalization objectives.
Zeroing Methodology
On June 12, 2003, the EU requested consultations with respect to the United States use of “zeroing” in the calculation of antidumping margins. Zeroing is a practice by which the United States (and some other countries) treats certain price comparisons as zero values in calculating the overall dumping margin when such comparisons do not show dumping. This methodology has been upheld as consistent with U.S. law.
A panel was established on February 5, 2004 and several other countries have requested to join the consultations. Zeroing has also been raised with respect to antidumping duties imposed by the United States by the Canadian Government in the lumber case, the Brazilian Government in the silicon metal case and the Mexican Government in the cement and oil country tubular goods cases. In April 2004, the WTO panel in the lumber case ruled against the United States’ zeroing methodology. The WTO Appellate Body agreed with this ruling in its August 11, 2004 decision (similar to a prior March 2001 Appellate Body decision in Bed Linen from India). The United States and Canada agreed that a reasonable period of time for implementation would end on April 15, 2005.
Privatization Methodology under the U.S. Countervailing Duty Law
U.S. trading partners have also brought several cases against the methodology used by the Commerce Department in determining whether government subsidies to a government-owned company continue after the company has changed ownership or been privatized (so-called privatization methodology). In May 2000, the WTO Appellate Body found that the U.S. privatization methodology used in the case of hot-rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel products (Leaded Bar decision) was inconsistent with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The United States terminated the duties, but did not propose any legislative modifications as the EU had sought.
On November 13, 2000, the EU requested consultations in 14 separate U.S. countervailing duty proceedings (involving imports of steel and other products) with respect to the Commerce Department’s privatization methodology, arguing that this methodology was found to be inconsistent in the earlier Leaded Bar decision. Consultations were held in December 2000, and a panel was formed in September 2001. The panel ruled in July 2002 that the statutory provision on privatization (section 771(5) (F) of the Tariff Act of 1930) and the Commerce Department’s privatization methodology were inconsistent with the WTO Subsidies Agreement. In December 2002, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that the Commerce Department’s methodology was inconsistent with the Subsidies Agreement. It rejected, however, the panel’s reasoning that an arm's length sale of a government-owned firm for fair market value always extinguishes prior subsidies; rather it creates a rebuttable presumption that prior subsidies are extinguished. The Appellate Body found that the statutory provision was not, therefore, inconsistent with WTO rules.
The Commerce Department modified its methodology on privatization and issued revised determinations, revoking two orders entirely and one order in part. In five additional cases, the Commerce Department recalculated the countervailing duty rates. On November 7, 2003, the United States informed the WTO that it had complied with the WTO rulings. On March 17, 2004, the EU informed the WTO that it found these actions insufficient and requested further consultations with the United States. A panel was established on September 27, 2004.
On December 21, 2000, Brazil requested consultations on the same issue with respect to countervailing duties imposed on Brazilian carbon steel products; consultations were held in January 2001. Brazil has not yet requested a panel. On January 21, 2003, Mexico requested consultations on the same issue with respect to a determination of steel plate and a panel was established on August 29, 2003.
Safeguard Measures
U.S. trading partners have also challenged the United States’ application of section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to wheat gluten, lamb meat, circular welded carbon line pipe, line pipe and wire rod, and steel products. In each of these cases, the WTO Appellate Body ruled against the United States, finding in particular flaws in the determination of whether dumped or subsidized imports caused injury or the threat thereof to the domestic industry.
Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan
On July 24, 2001, the WTO Appellate Body issued its report finding that the United States’ application of antidumping duties on imports of hot-rolled steel from Japan violated the WTO agreement on antidumping measures. In particular, the Appellate Body (and lower panel) found that the U.S. methodology for calculating the so-called “all-others rate” did not rely fully on actual company information, but included some calculations based on “facts available.” The Appellate Body also found fault with the ITC’s injury analysis. An arbitrator determined that the United States would have 15 months, until November 23, 2002, to comply with this ruling. While the United States complied with the ruling on the investigation, there remains at issue its lack of implementation of the all other’s rate. Japan has agreed to several extensions for the United States to come into compliance with this part of the decision, most recently to July 31, 2005.
Steel Plate from India
India requested consultations with the United States on its final antidumping and countervailing duty findings against steel plate products from India, alleging violations by both the Commerce Department and the ITC. In June 2002, the panel rejected three of India’s four claims, but found on the fourth that the United States’ use of total facts available was incorrect. The United States announced its intention to comply with the panel's report and both parties agreed that the reasonable period of time to implement the panel’s rulings would end on January 31, 2003. The Commerce Department issued a redetermination in this case on February 19, 2003, which it argued had brought it into compliance with its WTO obligations. India remains critical of the redetermination, but has not formally rechallenged the United States.
Corrosion-Resistant Steel from Germany
The EU requested consultations with the United States on its sunset review decision not to revoke a countervailing duty order on corrosion-resistant steel from Germany, alleging that the Commerce Department should have revoked the order because the rate of subsidization is less than 1 percent. The United States and EU held consultations in December 2000 and March 2001. A panel was established on September 10, 2001. In July 2002, the panel rejected most of the EU’s claims, finding that the U.S. system of automatically self-initiating sunset reviews is WTO-consistent. The panel found, however, that the Commerce Department’s failure to apply the 1 percent de minimis standard from CVD investigations to sunset reviews is WTO-inconsistent. The panel also found that Commerce's decision in the German steel sunset review lacked a sufficient factual basis. In November 2002, the Appellate Body affirmed the findings of the panel that had been appealed by the EU and reversed the finding that the 1 percent de minimis rule must be applied in sunset reviews too. The United States revoked the countervailing duty order on April 1, 2004.
Other Trade Remedy Cases
In addition to the cases discussed above, U.S. trading partners have challenged several U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty decisions, including: an Argentine complaint on antidumping duties on oil country tubular goods; an EU complaint against the imposition of antidumping duties on steel pipe from Italy; a Brazilian complaint against antidumping duties on silicon metal; a Japanese complaint against antidumping duties on corrosion-resistant steel; Mexican complaints against antidumping duties on oil country tubular goods and cement; and Canadian complaints against softwood lumber decisions (discussed in section 11).
ECAT POSITION: It is vitally important that both U.S. unfair trade laws and Section 201 maintain – in both the legal provisions and their application – a careful balance between the interests of the petitioning industry and the interests of other U.S. industries and consumers. It is critical that the Congress and the Administration oppose any efforts to impose import restraints or amend U.S. antidumping, countervailing duty, or safeguards laws in ways that would invite foreign retaliation, encourage restrictive foreign mirror legislation, and/or violate the United States’ international trade commitments.
Restructuring and Modernization of the U.S. Customs Service
The U.S. Customs Service represents a key element in the United States’ trade competitiveness. Its role has changed dramatically since it was first authorized to collect customs duties on goods in 1789. While duty collection remains important, the Customs Service plays an integral role in facilitating legitimate trade and protecting the nation’s borders.
Most recently, Customs faces a new challenge in becoming part of the new Department of Homeland Security. As emphasis shifts to bolster Customs’ border security functions, it is also critical to ensure that Customs’ commercial functions are maintained.
In recent years, outdated technology, understaffing and other impediments to modernization have hampered the ability of the Customs Service to operate efficiently and effectively in several areas. In order for U.S. farmers, manufacturers, service providers, and retailers to remain competitive, efforts must be made to help the U.S. Customs Service keep pace with technological developments and the changing international economic environment.
Transfer to Department of Homeland Security
In November 2002, Congress approved H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 2002. This legislation establishes a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States and reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism. As part of the consolidation of numerous U.S. Government functions, the U.S. Customs Service was moved from the Department of the Treasury to the DHS. Customs was placed within the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, along with the Transportation Administration of the Transportation Department, the Federal Protective Service of the General Services Administration, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center of the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of Domestic Preparedness of the Office of Justice Programs.
The Commissioner of Customs remains as head of the Customs Service within the new DHS.
Nevertheless, the statute provides that the customs revenue functions are not transferred to the DHS and that the Secretary of DHS may not consolidate, discontinue or diminish the customs revenue functions of the Customs Service or reduce staffing levels or resources attributable to these functions. Further, the Treasury Secretary is authorized to appoint up to 20 persons to work with the DHS in performing customs revenue functions.
No funds available to the Customs Service or customs user fees collected by Customs as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act may be transferred to any other agency or office of the DHS. The President is required to include a separate budget request for the Customs Service.
As part of the DHS, the Customs Service plans to expand its security initiatives, including the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (Customs-TPAT) initiative to enhance security throughout the entire import-export process and the Container Security Initiative, pursuant to which Customs has negotiated agreements with 19 of the world’s largest 20 ports to put into place tougher international security standards. These 20 ports represent passage points for approximately two-thirds of the cargo containers shipped to the United States. In June 2003, DHS and Customs announced plans to expand the Initiative beyond the 20 initial major ports to include areas in the Middle East, the Americas and Africa.
Automation Modernization
Customs has sought to develop and implement the so-called Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) to enable Customs to process more efficiently and cost-effectively imports and exports and to better protect U.S. borders from threats from abroad.
Start-up on ACE began in earnest in the summer of 2003 with the establishment of an ACE secure data portal and an initial 41 account participants. Activities have been expanded throughout 2004. In December 2004, Customs debuted in Blaine, Washington, its first port for “e-Manifest: Trucks” through which truck manifests are automated. Customs is now working on expanding to additional ports. It has also automated monthly statements and payments for importers and brokers. Customs continues to work on ACE transitions at additional ports for trucks. Customs also has dropped the requirement that participants in ACE be C-TPAT participants as well (C-TPAT refers to the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism).
ECAT continues to support full funding of the ACE program from general revenues and the modernization of Customs’ operations in order to promote more cost-efficient and effective commercial and enforcement programs.
Customs Modernization
The U.S. Customs Service also continues to be engaged in implementing the provisions of the Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978 (1978 Procedural Reform Act) and the Customs Modernization Act (the so-called Mod Act), which was enacted as title VI of the NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993. The 1993 Mod Act eliminated statutory requirements for paper documentation and provided authority for full electronic processing of customs-related transactions. In return for waiving paperwork requirements, the Mod Act imposed certain recordkeeping requirements on importers and required the production of some information after the fact. The Mod Act also authorized several automation initiatives based on the 1978 Procedural Reform Act, including remote-entry filing, periodic entry and duty payment. As well, the Mod Act required modifications in duty drawback provisions and procedural safeguards.
Under Mod Act authority and prior authority provided by the 1978 Procedural Reform Act, the Customs Service has engaged in a significant reorganization of its activities and functions. While Customs’ reorganization has resulted in some greater efficiency, the importing and exporting communities remain very concerned that implementation and interpretation of authorized reforms are not yet complete, nor fully consistent with the goals and requirements of the 1978 Procedural Reform Act and the Mod Act. In particular, concerns have been raised regarding:
- Customs’ Compliance Assessment and its Trade Compliance Risk Management processes, including Customs’ reliance on audit-based evidentiary standards (relying on the Generally Accepted Government Audit Standards (GAGAS) rather than the reasonable care standard of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)).
- Customs’ Compliance Measurement and its associated penalty processes (increased cargo inspections, etc.) which penalize otherwise compliant and unsuspecting importers for errors or omissions caused by licensed brokers and express couriers.
ECAT supports efforts to further modernize the Customs Service to promote greater trade facilitation and efficiency in a manner consistent with its mandate. In particular, ECAT believes that Customs could substantially improve its operations to better achieve border and economic security through adoption of the following proposals:
- Eliminate reconciliation for all entries that provide statistical updates only and have no impact on revenue;
- Simplify and reduce the Harmonized Tariff Schedule;
- Provide a total electronic interface for all required data to eliminate paper documents;
- Eliminate the release of confidential and trade sensitive date to non-governmental agencies;
- Operate ports 24 hours/7 days a week;
- Reduce the required data for exports and imports to a single set of data to satisfy both transactions as conceived under the ITDS model.
ECAT remains very concerned with Customs’ adoption of the “24-hour manifest rule,” which became effective in December 2002. Pursuant to Customs’ regulations, all carriers and non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs) are required to file their cargo declarations 24 hours before their cargo is laden aboard a vessel at a foreign port. While ECAT recognizes and supports the U.S. Government’s interest in evaluating the contents of shipments for national security and other reasons, this rule does not substantially advance that goal. Rather, it will impede commercial shipments, which oftentimes do not have fully complete manifest information ready that far in advance of shipment. This regulation is overly restrictive and will impede the legitimate commercial flow of goods into the United States to the detriment of U.S. companies, workers and their families. At the same time, it will do little to deter those who seek to evade U.S. laws who can continue to file fraudulent manifests.
ECAT POSITION: ECAT is committed to working with the Customs Service, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of the Treasury to help ensure that Customs’ restructuring progresses in a manner that fulfills our national security and enforcement goals, while also facilitating the flow of legitimate commercial trade that provides enormous economic benefits to the United States. ECAT strongly supports full funding of the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) from general revenues. ECAT also strongly supports improvements in the operation of the Customs Service, including through full and improved implementation of the Customs Modernization Act and the Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978 in a manner that facilitates trade.
Reform of Trade Adjustment Assistance and Worker Retraining Programs
The original Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs for workers and for firms were enacted as part of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. These programs were premised on the recognition that while trade liberalization supports economic growth and prosperity for the United States as a whole, certain workers and companies may be adversely affected by the adjustment to trade liberalization. The TAA for Workers and the TAA for Firms programs enacted in 1962 were last modified in the Trade Act of 1974. The third TAA program, NAFTA-TAA for Workers, was enacted as part of the NAFTA Implementation Act in 1993 and is focused on workers adversely impacted by trade with Canada and/or Mexico. Both the general TAA and the NAFTA-TAA programs have provided direct assistance and training to workers who are laid off in trade-impacted industries. Approximately 163,000 workers per year have used the programs, which cost $457 million annually. The main beneficiaries have been apparel/textile, oil and gas, electronics, and the metal/machinery industries. The NAFTA Implementation Act also established a fourth program, the Community Adjustment and Investment Program (CAIP), to provide funds for community adjustment and investment.
In 2002, Congress approved a substantial modernization and reform of the TAA programs as part of the Trade Act of 2002. This legislation was based on legislation authored by Senator Bingaman (D-NM) and cosponsored by Senator Baucus (D-MT) and former Minority Leader Daschle (D-SD).
Major Provisions of Trade Adjustment Assistance as Reformed by the Trade Act of 2002
The Trade Act of 2002 made the first major reforms of the TAA programs since 1974 and extended the programs through September 30, 2007. The major provisions include:
TAA for Workers and NAFTA-TAA Programs
- Merges the general TAA for Workers and NAFTA-TAA programs.
- Coordinates assistance with the Workforce Investment Act, including rapid response assistance.
- Modifies eligibility requirements to address the following issues:
- Shifts in Production: Expands eligibility from workers affected by shifts in production to Canada and Mexico to workers affected by shifts in production to any country.
- Secondary Workers: Expands eligibility to adversely affected secondary workers where (1) a significant proportion of workers have been separated; (2) the firm supplies or is a downstream producer (i.e., performing additional, value-added production processes to articles) to another firm that is eligible for TAA related to the product produced by the petitioning firm; and (3) the loss of business with that other firm contributed importantly to the workers’ separation or the relevant component parts produced by the firm account for at least 20 percent of the firm’s production or sales.
- Waiver of Training Requirement: Provides that the Labor Secretary may waive the mandatory training requirement (which is a prerequisite to payments under the TAA program) in certain defined circumstances (e.g., the worker will shortly be recalled by his original firm, the worker already has marketable skills, the worker is within two years of meeting retirement entitlement, the worker’s health prevents him from participating in training; training is not available, etc.).
- Expansion of Benefits: In addition to wage insurance and the tax credit for COBRA payments discussed below, new TAA programs will:
- Increase income maintenance payments to certified workers from 52 to 78 weeks;
- Increase substantially funds for training from $70 million to $220 million;
- Increase assistance for job relocation; and
- Provide greater assistance to link TAA beneficiaries to other benefits, such as child care and health care.
- Demonstration Project for Older Workers: Not later than one year after enactment, the Secretary of Labor must establish a wage insurance program under which states shall use TAA funds to pay certain workers for up to two years. Eligible workers must be at least 50-years old working at least 30 hours a week and earning no more than $50,000 a year in wages. The wage insurance subsidy is to be equal to 50 percent of the difference between the wages received from reemployment and the wages received at the time of separation. In addition, workers will be eligible to receive, for a period not to exceed two years, a credit for health insurance. Total wage insurance per worker is capped at $10,000 over the two-year period.
- Tax Credit for COBRA Continuation: Provides a 65-percent advance, refundable tax credit for payment of COBRA premiums (to extend health insurance after separation) for two years for eligible TAA or Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation recipients.
Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms:
- Reauthorizes program through September 30, 2007.
- Expands eligibility criteria to allow firms affected by shifts in production to countries in addition to Canada or Mexico to claim benefits.
Agriculture Trade Adjustment Assistance
- Incorporates Conrad (D-ND)-Grassley (R-IA) provisions to establish a program through September 30, 2007 to provide cash payments to farmers (without training requirement, but training is available) as a result of declines in commodity prices. Does not base eligibility on job loss.
- Caps total per producer payments at $10,000 annually. Total payments under this program are capped at $90 million annually.
- Requires Secretary of Commerce to conduct a study on whether a TAA program is appropriate or feasible for fishermen.
Implementation and Continued Review of TAA Reforms
Given the significant reforms undertaken in the Trade Act of 2002 and key demonstration projects on wage insurance and health care coverage, careful implementation and continued review of the effectiveness of these programs will be critical.
In the 109th Congress, several proposals have already been introduced to make changes in the TAA programs, including:
- H.R. 466, introduced by Representatives Graves (R-MO), McHugh (R-NY) and Scott (D-GA) to designate the Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade to oversee the TAA programs.
- H.R. 614, NAFTA-Impacted Communities Relief Act, introduced by Representative McIntyre (D- NC).
- H.R. 1281, introduced by Representatives King (D-NY) and Christensen (D-VI) to extend TAA benefits to services workers.
- S. 14, Fair Wage, Competition and Investment Act of 2005, by Senator Stabenow (D-MI) and others, which includes a provision to extend TAA benefits to services workers.
In the 108th Congress, other proposals were made to broaden trade adjustment assistance to communities (S. 1110 and H.R. 2308, the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Communities Act, S. 1299, Trade Readjustment and Development Enhancement for America’s Communities Act, S. 1884, Enhance Domestic Manufacturing and Worker Assistance Act) and to expand the period of COBRA coverage for TAA recipients for the full period that they are eligible for TAA (S. 2226). .
Private Sector Retraining Efforts
Many companies, including ECAT members, have developed their own worker retraining programs to help address the concerns about dislocations caused by technological developments, trade, and other forces. These companies have focused on continued education and intensive retraining through the use of community colleges, the Internet, and other education resources. These programs, in conjunction with government efforts, represent an important facet of worker readjustment efforts.
ECAT POSITION: ECAT recognizes that while expanding U.S. international trade and investment raises the U.S. standard of living overall, dislocations occur and must be addressed through public and private worker retraining and assistance programs. ECAT supports efforts to implement the trade adjustment assistance provisions of the Trade Act of 2002 and to continue to review the effectiveness of these programs and other proposals in addressing the needs of today’s workers.
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