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SECTION II.2: MAJOR FREE TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS ECAT ECAT member companies actively support the negotiation and implementation of comprehensive and trade-oriented bilateral, sub-regional and regional trade and investment agreements, in addition to the global World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations discussed in section II.1. ECAT also strongly supports the continued trade-negotiating-authority framework – first established in the Trade Act of 1974 as “fast track” and most recently extended as so-called Trade Promotion Authority in the Trade Act of 2002. This framework creates an executive-congressional partnership that defines negotiating objectives, establishes consultation requirements and provides for an up-or-down vote in Congress within a time certain to approve and implement trade agreements. In the 1990s, the United States led trade and investment liberalization efforts with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as several WTO agreements. That agenda was almost quiescent following the expiration of trade negotiating authority, until Congress approved Trade Promotion Authority in 2002. With that authority, the United States was able to accelerate and conclude ongoing negotiations and initiate several new ones. That authority was extended last year for agreements concluded before July 1, 2007. Since its enactment in 2002, TPA procedures and authority have been used repeatedly to begin, pursue and conclude negotiations with numerous countries and sub-regional country groups, as well as to implement six U.S. free trade agreements – with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain and the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Most recently, the Administration has announced that it will soon begin FTA negotiations with two very large U.S. trading partners, Korea and Malaysia. These agreements and negotiations are important not only for the trade and investment liberalization that they bring, but also in maintaining a level playing field, as many of the United States’ trading partners, particularly the European Union (EU), Canada and Mexico, have embarked on a series of bilateral, sub-regional and regional free trade agreements that provide special benefits to their farmers, manufacturers, service providers and workers, excluding the United States from these special benefits. While progress at the global level, i.e., the WTO, is the greatest prize, the United States’ bilateral, sub-regional and regional efforts have been helpful to spur those global negotiations forward by creating support for higher standard liberalization commitments by developed and developing country partners. This section reviews the TPA process and its importance and then examines recently completed and ongoing bilateral, sub-regional and regional trade negotiations. Trade Promotion Authority Framework Almost 10 years after its expiration in 1994, Congress passed and the President signed into law trade promotion authority legislation as part of the Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-210. The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA Act) revives and extends trade-negotiating-authority legislation (formerly called “fast track”), which was developed over three decades ago as part of the Trade Act of 1974. TPA establishes negotiating authority for global, bilateral and regional trade negotiations, consultation requirements and congressional procedures guaranteeing an up-or-down vote, without amendments in a time certain for agreements meeting the requirements of TPA. Following the two-year renewal of TPA last year, TPA procedures govern agreements concluded before July 1, 2007. TPA serves several purposes, including setting forth:
TPA is important to: (1) enhance U.S. leadership on trade and the President’s ability to conclude negotiations with foreign trading partners; (2) facilitate Congress’ consideration and implementation of such agreements; and (3) provide for greater Administration-Congressional consultations on issues where both the President and the Congress have overlapping constitutional prerogatives. As explained in greater detail below, the Administration is engaged in several important negotiations that will not be concluded before the July 1, 2007, deadline set in the TPA legislation. Prior to the renewal of TPA in 2002, trade-negotiating-authority procedures were used by Congress to consider five different trade agreements, all of which were approved and implemented: the GATT Tokyo Round Agreements (implemented by the Trade Act of 1979), the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (1985), the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (1989), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1993), and the Uruguay Round Agreements (1994). Trade-negotiating-authority legislation expired in 1994 and was not renewed until 2002 with the Trade Act of 2002. Since the renewal of this authority in 2002, TPA procedures have been used by Congress to consider the following free trade agreements:
The TPA procedures will also likely be used by Congress to implement the U.S.-Oman, U.S.-Peru and U.S.-Colombia FTAs, which have been negotiated, as well as other FTAs that are concluded prior to the expiration of TPA authority.
Major Provisions of TPA Duration: Provides TPA authority for free trade and tariff-only agreements entered into force before July 1, 2005, with potential two-year extension. TPA procedures are extended for two years if the President requests extension and neither House adopt an extension disapproval resolution (considered under expedited procedures) prior to July 1, 2005. Negotiating Objectives: Provides the most extensive negotiating objectives ever included in a trade-negotiating-authority bill and specifically directs the Administration to seek agreements that:
Promotion of Other Priorities: Directs the President to pursue additional priorities, including to:
Progress Towards Negotiating Objectives: Provides that no trade agreement may qualify for expedited procedures (described below) unless it “makes progress” in meeting the applicable negotiating objectives and the President fulfills the consultations requirements. The President is also required to report to Congress on how the final agreement makes progress towards the bill’s objectives. Expedited Procedures: Authorizes expedited procedures as contained in the original trade-negotiating -uthority legislation for implementing bills that contain provisions “necessary or appropriate” to implement the underlying trade agreement. Procedures require that 45 session days after an implementing bill is introduced, the relevant House committee(s) must report the implementing bill (without amendment) or be automatically discharged. The Senate committee(s) must report the bill (without amendment) or be automatically discharged 15 session days after its receipt from the House or 45 session days after its introduction, whichever is later. The implementing bill can be considered for up to 20 hours, without amendment on both the House and Senate floors. A chart showing the TPA timeline is provided below:
Congressional Consultations: Provides extensive provisions for Congressional consultations beyond that included in prior trade-negotiating authority legislation, including the establishment of a permanent Congressional Oversight Group (COG) to provide ongoing oversight of negotiations. TPA Act provides that TPA procedures are not applicable if both Houses separately agree to procedural disapproval resolutions (under expedited floor procedures) for lack of notice or consultations within 60 days of each other. ECAT Position: ECAT strongly supports the TPA framework to enable the United States to continue to negotiate and implement comprehensive, high-standard global, bilateral, sub-regional and regional trade agreements. Completed Free Trade Agreements Following enactment of TPA, the Bush Administration embarked on a very active agenda to negotiate free trade agreements on a bilateral, sub-regional and regional level. In 2003, agreements with Chile and Singapore were reached and approved by the U.S. Congress. In 2004, agreements with Australia and Morocco were concluded and also implemented by the U.S. Congress. In 2005, agreements with five countries in Central America and the Dominican Republic and with Bahrain were approved by Congress. The United States now has FTAs in force with nine countries, with several more expected to enter into force later this year.
U.S. trade with existing FTA partners has proven to be a significant benefit to the U.S. economy. U.S. trade with FTA partners accounts for approximately $925 billion or nearly 36 percent of total U.S. trade and 45 percent of U.S. exports. U.S. exports to each of its major FTA partners have increased significantly after the FTA has entered into force. Consider the following growth in U.S. goods exports:
Overall, U.S. exports to FTA partners have grown 20 percent, faster than overall U.S. exports. U.S. services exports have also increased. In particular, U.S. services exports to the NAFTA countries nearly doubled between 1993 and 2005, from $181 billion to $341 billion. As well, U.S. investment has expanded following the entry-into-force of FTAs with major trading partners, supporting greater economic growth, better paying jobs and greater productivity here in the United States. Imports from U.S. FTA partners have also increased significantly, expanding the variety and choice of products to U.S. consumers at competitive prices, lowering costs to U.S. manufacturers and dampening inflationary pressures. Nor is there any basis for critics’ claims that FTAs produce significant trade deficits. Indeed the goods trade deficit with the eight countries with which the United States has FTAs in force, represents 15.9 percent of the total U.S. trade deficit.
U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement On December 17, 2003, the United States and El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua completed negotiations to create a U.S.-Central America FTA, less than one year after such negotiations were initiated on January 8, 2003. On January 25, 2004, the United States and Costa Rica completed negotiations to bring Costa Rica into the U.S.-Central America FTA. On March 15, 2004, the United States and the Dominican Republic completed negotiations to bring the Dominican Republic into the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic FTA. The United States signed an FTA with the five Central American nations on May 28, 2004. The Dominican Republic was formally added as an FTA partner on August 5, 2004. After an extended period of review, Congress approved CAFTA in July 2005, by a vote of 217-to-215 in the House and a vote of 55-to-45 in the Senate. CAFTA entered into force between the United States and El Salvador on March 1, 2006. It will enter into force with respect to the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua when the U.S. government has certified that these countries have implemented the terms of the CAFTA. Costa Rica’s legislature must first approve CAFTA and implement it before the United States will embark on the certification process with Costa Rica. Major Provisions of the DR-CAFTA The primary provisions of the CAFTA include the following:
Opportunities Created Collectively, CAFTA is the second largest U.S. export market in Latin America and the United States’ 20th largest export market worldwide in 2005. Two-way trade equaled nearly $35 billion in 2005. Once in force, the CAFTA will be the United States’ third largest FTA in terms of total trade flows after the NAFTA and the Singapore FTA. U.S. products already account for about 50 percent of Central America’s imports. Central America and the Dominican Republic are already an important export market for American electrical machinery, high tech products, , motor vehicles, chemicals, energy, food, agricultural products, paper, textiles and fertilizer. U.S. services exports total more than $2 billion. Through unilateral preference programs overwhelming approved by Congress from 1983 onward, 75 percent of CAFTA imports and 99 percent of CAFTA agricultural products already enter the United States duty-free. CAFTA locks in those benefits and expands on them. More importantly, CAFTA countries will open their markets to our farm and industrial goods and services, eliminating high tariffs, tariff rate quotas and non-tariff barriers. The CAFTA countries are the United States’ largest market for U.S. apparel and yarn exports, and the second largest market for U.S. fabric exports. CAFTA is critical to sustain and expand existing partnerships and to give U.S.-CAFTA goods a competitive edge to help support the approximately 500,000 jobs in Central America and the Dominican Republic in the apparel sector and the 700,000 jobs in the U.S. yarn and textile industries. The CAFTA is about much more than trade and investment. This agreement can help strengthen democracy and the rule of law in a region that was wrecked by civil war not that long ago. This agreement can help promote economic development and the reduction of poverty for these countries. While the FTA will not cure these problems, it represents a force for positive change by generating new economic opportunities, new investment and new hope for the region. Expanded commercial relations with the United States based on growing trade and investment flows may be the most effective way for the United States to help these countries raise their standard of living. This agreement also represents an example of how the United States can reach an FTA with six developing countries. It will build relationships that will be important not only as efforts at regional integration continue, but also for our interests at the WTO and our broader national interests. It will also promote new economic opportunities, allow greater access to innovative productivity equipment and provide needed alternatives to illegal narcotics activity, illegal immigration, gangs and arms trafficking. Implementation Issues CAFTA entered into force between the United States and El Salvador on March 1, 2006. Despite this extremely positive development, ECAT is very concerned by the administration of the staggered implementation process and, in particular, its impact on the textile and apparel commercial relationship between the United States and the six CAFTA countries. Textile and apparel production in this region is integrated and oftentimes one garment will have fabric from or manufacturing in several countries. Implementation of the CAFTA on a staggered basis may have several very adverse consequences given this co-production model. In particular, there is significant concern that certain products may receive neither the duty-free treatment they would currently receive under Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) or under the CAFTA, contrary to the goals of both pieces of legislation. ECAT urges the Administration to correct this implementation issue as soon as possible so as not to cause negative commercial impacts in the United States or the CAFTA countries in a very vital industry. ECAT Position: ECAT strongly supports the entry-into-force and full implementation of the DR-CAFTA. Given co-production and the interrelationship of commercial interests in the United States and the DR-CAFTA countries, particularly in the production of textiles and apparel, it is critical that the entry-into-force of the DR-CAFTA on a staggered basis improve, and not undermine, existing commercial activities. In particular, ECAT remains very concerned by implementation decisions that deny duty-free access to textile and apparel products from the DR-CAFTA countries that are provided for under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and the DR-CAFTA because of the staggered entry-into-force. Implementation issues must be resolved in a manner that improves U.S. competitiveness and seeks to promote continued and expanded commercial interests in the region. U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement The United States launched FTA negotiations in January 2004 with Bahrain, which concluded on May 27, 2004. The FTA was signed on September 14, 2004, and was approved by Congress in December 2005, by a vote of 327-to-95 in the House and by unanimous consent in the Senate. Major Provisions of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA The primary provisions of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA include the following:
A separate investment chapter was not included since the United States and Bahrain already have a strong bilateral investment treaty in force. Opportunities Created Two-way trade between the United States and Bahrain equaled $782 million in 2005. In 2005, U.S. goods exports to Bahrain totaled $350 million, which included aircraft, vehicles, machinery, toys, sports equipment, and pharmaceutical products. Among the key U.S. agricultural commodity exports that will benefit from the U.S.-Bahrain FTA are meats, fruits and vegetables, cereals, and dairy products. An FTA with Bahrain will support its continued economic reform and openness to investment, as well as its commitment to openness, transparency, high-standard intellectual property protection that keeps pace with digital innovations and the rule of law. It also represents an important step towards a broader Middle East FTA that the Administration seeks to have established by 2013. Next Steps The U.S.-Bahrain FTA is expected to enter into force later in 2006. ECAT Position: ECAT supports full implementation of the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement. Recently Negotiated Free Trade Agreements The United States has completed several FTA negotiations that are awaiting signing and/or approval. They are:
The Oman, Peru, and Colombia agreements are discussed below. U.S.-Oman FTA The United States and Oman concluded FTA negotiations in October 2005 and signed the agreement on January 19, 2006, less than one year after negotiations were launched. The agreement is expected to be presented to Congress for implementation later this year. Major Provisions of the U.S.-Oman FTA The primary provisions of the U.S.-Oman FTA include the following:
Opportunities Created Two-way goods trade between the United States and Oman equaled $1.15 billion in 2005, a 30 percent increase over 2004 trade of $748 billion. Principal U.S. exports to Oman include aircraft, automobiles, nuclear machinery, and electrical machinery. Principal imports from Oman include fuel, precious stones and apparel. An FTA with Oman will support its continued economic reform and openness to investment, as well as its commitment to openness, transparency, high-standard intellectual property protection that keeps pace with digital innovations and the rule of law. It also represents an important step towards a broader Middle East FTA. ECAT Position: ECAT supports Congressional approval and the timely implementation of the U.S.-Oman FTA. Andean Pact Agreements The United States launched FTA negotiations with Colombia, Ecuador and Peru in May 2004, seeking to conclude a U.S.-Andean FTA. Negotiations with Peru were completed on December 7, 2005, and negotiations with Colombia were completed on February 27, 2006. Negotiations with Ecuador remain ongoing and negotiations with Bolivia have not been launched. While the Peru agreement may be sent to Congress initially as a separate agreement, ECAT expects and strongly supports that the two agreements will be joined together as quickly as possible to ensure integrated liberalization between the United States and both countries. If Ecuador concludes its negotiation in a timely manner, Ecuador may also be included in an integrated Andean FTA. Major Provisions of U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement The primary provisions of the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement include the following:
Major Provisions of U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement While the final text is currently undergoing a legal scrub, the primary provisions of the U.S.-Colombia FTA, based on U.S. government summaries, include the following:
Opportunities Created U.S. trade with Peru and Colombia equaled $21.8 billion in 2005, with exports to Peru and Colombia accounting for $7.8 billion. U.S. exports to Peru equaled $2.3 billion in 2005, with significant exports of machinery, fuel, plastics and processed foods. U.S. imports from Peru totaled $5.1 billion in 2005, with major imports of precious stones, fuel, apparel and copper. U.S. exports to Colombia equaled $5.5 billion in 2005, with significant exports of machinery, chemicals and processed foods. U.S. imports from Colombia totaled $8.9 billion in 2005, with major imports of fuel, coffee, plants, precious stones and apparel. U.S. foreign direct investment in the Peru equaled $3.934 billion and in Colombia equaled $2.987 billion in 2004. Most imports from Peru and Colombia (as well as the Andean Pact countries of Ecuador and Bolivia) already receive duty-free treatment under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which was enacted as part of the Trade Act of 2002. (Background on the ATPDEA and its predecessor legislation, the Andean Trade Preference Act, is found in section IV.3.) The Peru-Colombia agreements expand this duty-free treatment and make it permanent. The U.S.-Peru-Colombia trade agreement will expand opportunities for U.S. producers by opening markets and eliminating key barriers. It will also make important improvements to investment protections, intellectual property rights, and transparency that will promote the rule of law. For Peru and Colombia, the trade agreement will expand opportunities and promote economic growth. Given existing concerns over rule of law issues, including the enforcement of existing commitments, in Ecuador, ECAT strongly urges the Administration to continue to seek an FTA of the highest-possible standard with Ecuador and to incorporate each of the key investment provisions that guarantee protections to U.S. investors, including with respect to investor-state arbitration for breaches of investment agreements. ECAT Position: ECAT supports Congressional approval and implementation of the U.S. Peru and U.S.-Colombia trade agreements as quickly as possible. ECAT also urges the Administration to ensure that existing Ecuadorian government commitments are upheld, particularly regarding investment, so that negotiations with Ecuador produce an enforceable and commercially meaningful FTA. Ongoing Free Trade Agreement Negotiations The Administration is engaged in or will soon begin the bilateral and sub-regional negotiations identified in the following table:
U.S.-Korea FTA Negotiations The United States and the Republic of South Korea announced on February 2, 2006 their intention to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement. According to the TPA 90-day Congressional notification requirement, the United States may begin negotiations after May 4, 2006. ECAT supports the negotiation of a comprehensive, high-standard and commercially meaningful FTA with Korea that creates concrete new trade and investment opportunities for U.S. companies, farmers, workers and their families. Such an agreement should promote liberalization throughout all key economic sectors, harmonization of our approach to regulatory matters affecting key sectors, effective protections for investment and intellectual property rights, strong and transparent government procurement rules, efficient dispute resolution procedures, and effective implementation. Negotiation of a U.S.-Korea FTA has, of course, major challenges, particularly given the opaque nature of the Korean regulatory and market structure. U.S. negotiators will need to delve deeper than prior FTAs to address these major barriers to trade and investment. It is extremely important to include comprehensive and sector-specific approaches to address these barriers, particularly in industries that have experienced long-term and systemic market access restrictions, or where the non-tariff barriers are particularly severe or pervasive. ECAT welcomes the progress achieved by the Administration in addressing a few barriers, such as some cultural protection and agricultural issues, prior to the joint announcement of the intention to launch the negotiations. Yet, many other barriers exist that will need to be eliminated through the FTA. 63 The importance of concluding a comprehensive and commercially meaningful FTA with Korea is amplified by the strength of the existing trade and investment relationship. Korea is the United States’ seventh largest trading partner, with two-way goods trade in 2005 of $71 billion. U.S. goods exports to Korea totaled $27.7 billion in 2005, with significant exports in machinery, agricultural products, aircraft and chemicals. U.S. goods imports from Korea totaled $43.8 billion in 2005, with significant imports of automobiles, telecommunications and electrical equipment and machinery. U.S. cross-border services exports to Korea totaled $9.1 billion, and U.S. imports of services from Korea totaled $4.3 billion in 2004. U.S. foreign direct investment in Korea in 2004 reached approximately $17.3 billion, and Korean investment in the United States equaled $4.2 billion in 2004. Key negotiating objectives sought by ECAT include the following: The investment chapter in the U.S.-Korea FTA should ensure high levels of market access, as well as protections for U.S. investors abroad, including protections related to national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment, expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, the free transfer of capital, no performance requirements, and full coverage for investment agreements. It is critical, as well, that the investment chapter include a strong investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, as developed in the Model BIT, to ensure objective and full resolution of investors’ individual disputes that are covered by the FTA. Furthermore, recent improvements in the investment text, incorporated into the U.S.-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the Model BIT, particularly with regard to investment agreements, should be incorporated into the investment chapter of a Korea FTA. ECAT very much would like to see the elimination of the prudential carve-out contained in the financial services chapter that restricts access to dispute settlement for certain financial services issues. If that carve-out is repeated in the Korea FTA, ECAT would, at a minimum, strongly urge the inclusion of the additional explanatory text included in the U.S.-Uruguay BIT on this issue. With regard to market access, it is critical that foreign equity limitations be reduced and eventually eliminated. An important example is the 49-percent cap on foreign investment in the telecommunication industry (fixed line and wireless). The restriction is a trade barrier and thwarts growth, undermining Korea’s desire to remain the forerunner in advanced telecommunications technology and become a regional financial hub. Access to broadband and wireless is near a saturation point and increased investment in the telecommunications sector is vital if the current growth is to be sustained, but the inability of foreign investors to further invest has depressed share prices and makes Korea telecom companies an unattractive investment even for domestic investors. In addition, this phenomenon has increased the cost of equity funding and hampers the ability to finance expansion or network upgrades and to develop and launch new services and products. Similarly, the Korean Broadcast Company’s foreign investment restrictions, that limit ownership of Korea's broadcasting operations to less than half, should be addressed. In addition to limitations on ownership of cable television-related system operators, network operators, non-news channel program providers ("PPs") and satellite broadcasters, foreign companies are prohibited from investing at all in PPs providing comprehensive news channels. Restrictive investment policies in major service and manufacturing sectors more broadly undermine Korea’s competitiveness and create an unlevel playing field for U.S. participation in the market. Of even greater importance is the need to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade in the Korean economy, which can take many forms, including monopolies, licenses, labeling and certification requirements, lack of regulatory harmonization and consistency, anti-competitive pricing and reimbursement policies, costly customs valuation policies and cumbersome customs procedures -- all of which can limit full participation in Korea’s economy. Such barriers distort efficient trade flows of goods to the detriment of the United States. Their elimination would help spur U.S. exports and increase efficiency and rationality in the global marketplace. Given the extensive and opaque nature of Korea’s regulatory and market environment, U.S. negotiators will need to develop new approaches, including sectoral frameworks, to address these barriers in an effective and comprehensive manner that results in concrete improvements in market access. An area of particular interest for U.S. negotiators is the Korea automotive market. Despite several attempts to promote greater access for U.S. manufactured vehicles in Korea, including the 1995 and 1998 U.S.-Korea Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and a 2001 U.S.-Korea working group, significant market-access barriers remain and imports of U.S.-sourced vehicles into Korea continue to decline. A sector-specific approach may be required to address Korea’s long-standing auto import barriers that include tariffs, discriminatory taxes, unique regulatory requirements, and anti-import bias. Another key area of interest for U.S. companies is Korea’s burdensome testing and certification processes in many areas and the adoption of mandatory technology requirements or standards. For example, redundant testing requirements for information communication technology (ICT) products represent a significant barrier and limit Korea’s own access to the highest quality ICT products that will support Korea’s own productivity and growth. ECAT strongly supports resolution of all key testing and certification issues with commitments to adopt common standards, such as the “One-Standard One-Test Shipper’s Declaration of Conformity” for the clearing of all high-tech products, or Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA) where conformity in standards is not possible. ECAT would also urge that technology standards development should be voluntary, industry-led, and consensus-based, and should respect intellectual property rights. As a general matter, the marketplace, rather than the government, should determine adoption of technology standards. Accordingly, government procurement should avoid mandating standards or technologies wherever possible, and any technical specifications in procurements should be based on performance and functional requirements rather than design or descriptive characteristics. As well, despite significant negotiations and work with the Korean government, Korea maintains a host of non-tariff barriers that impede the introduction and availability of innovative medicines. These barriers will need to be addressed through the FTA negotiations. ECAT also urges that the textile and apparel provisions permit cumulation. While Korea is not a substantial supplier of such products, it is very much in the United States’ interest to promote cumulation across all of our FTAs. Key tariffs that should be eliminated through the FTA include Korea’s import duties on: high-fructose corn syrup and sugar, fruit juice, resin and milk powder, as well as food preparations classified in HTS 2106.90, mixtures used in the food and drink industry classified in HTS 3302.10, and certain chemical products classified in HTS 3824.90. Non-tariff barriers in Korea’s agricultural sector that need to be addressed include:
ECAT also urges that Korea agree to accept the "Food and Extract Manufacturers Association Generally Recognized as Safe" (or FEMA - GRAS) list of approved ingredients. Adoption of this list would accelerate and simplify trade between the United States and Korea. Key objectives of the FTA services negotiations should include the following:
A related U.S. industry concern is the investigation and regulation by Korean authorities of commercial practices by U.S. suppliers after these practices have already been investigated by U.S. antitrust authorities. For instance, in one recent case, the Korean Fair Trade Commission imposed far-reaching sanctions against a leading U.S. supplier for practices that had already been reviewed – indeed were undertaken in compliance with remedies already imposed – by the United States Department of Justice. Such divergent competition remedies pose a major threat to global trade, as they substantially increase business uncertainty and may force global U.S. suppliers to fragment their global development and distribution chains, thereby creating inefficiencies and preventing U.S. suppliers from reaping the full benefits of international trade. In ECAT’s view, it is critical that a U.S.-Korea FTA include a robust competition chapter that improves transparency and prevents trade-distorting uses of competition law. Building upon the competition commitments set forth in recent FTAs (e.g., with Australia), the Korea FTA should strengthen obligations for national authorities not to apply competition rules in a manner that unnecessarily distorts trade or that nullifies the benefits otherwise accruing to exporters under other provisions of the FTA. One option would be to incorporate into the Korea FTA certain “comity” commitments set out in competition cooperation agreements that the United States has executed with several of its key trading partners. Such comity provisions would serve to strengthen coordination between U.S. and Korean competition authorities, particularly in cases where divergent outcomes threaten to distort bilateral trade. The risk of divergent remedies would also be lessened by ensuring that Korean regulators have clear legal authority to resolve cases on mutually agreed terms with the targets of enforcement action. In addition, further reform of Korea’s procurement sector is necessary to eliminate discriminatory and onerous barriers, including:
In particular, the FTA should provide for intellectual-property protections similar to those found in U.S. law and recent U.S. FTAs, as directed by the Trade Act of 2002, and to ensure conformity with global standards, including the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) and the Berne Convention. The FTA should also ensure transparent and consistent intellectual-property enforcement procedures. Particular issues that need to be resolved in the intellectual property area, include:
ECAT urges U.S. negotiators to seek a comprehensive and commercially meaningful U.S.-Korea FTA that protects and promotes investment, intellectual property rights and digital trade and information technology, while eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers and liberalizing trade in agricultural and manufactured goods and services. ECAT Position: ECAT supports the timely completion and implementation of a comprehensive, high-standard and commercially meaningful U.S.-Korea FTA that will liberalize trade and investment, eliminate Korea’s extensive non-tariff, customs and other barriers to full market access by U.S. manufacturers, farmers, service providers and investors and strengthen disciplines on intellectual property, investment, government procurement and transparency. U.S.-Malaysia FTA Negotiations On March 8, 2006, the United States and Malaysia announced their intention to launch FTA negotiations. According to the TPA 90-day Congressional notification requirement, the United States may begin negotiations by June 7, 2006. Malaysia is the United States’ 10th largest trading partner. The U.S.-Malaysian commercial relationship has nearly quintupled over the last fifteen years, from two-trade in goods of $8.7 billion in 1990 to a $44.15 billion relationship in 2005. U.S. goods exports to Malaysia equaled $10.5 billion in 2005, with significant exports of machinery, medical equipment and aircraft. U.S. goods imports from Malaysia equaled $33.7 billion in 2005, with significant imports of machinery, furniture, and rubber products. U.S. services exports to Malaysia totaled $1.2 billion and U.S. services imports from Malaysia equaled $382 million in 2004. U.S. foreign direct investment in Malaysia equaled $8.7 in 2004. A comprehensive and high-standard FTA with Malaysia will improve and help grow that relationship by eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to greater trade and investment. A strong FTA will also strengthen the broader U.S.-Malaysian relationship and enhance broader U.S. national interests in Asia. In particular, ECAT urges U.S. negotiators to seek the elimination of the following barriers as part of the FTA negotiations:
ECAT Position: ECAT supports the timely completion and implementation of a comprehensive, high-standard and commercially meaningful U.S.-Malaysia FTA that will eliminate tariff and customs and other non-tariff barriers, further liberalize trade and investment and strengthen disciplines on intellectual property, investment, government procurement and transparency. U.S.-Panama FTA Negotiations The United States launched FTA negotiations in April 2004, but negotiations were not completed as expected by early 2005. U.S. goods exports to Panama equaled. $2.2 billion in 2005, with major exports of fuel, machinery and pharmaceutical products. U.S. goods imports from Panama equaled $327 million, with significant imports of agricultural goods and precious stones. ECAT supports a comprehensive and commercially meaningful FTA with Panama that will eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment and help create new opportunities for the United States and Panama. The United States and Panama have a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in force that was negotiated in 1982. While there are significant deficiencies with this BIT, including its exclusion of key sectors, it does provide full protection for investment agreements (existing and prospective). As a result, ECAT very strongly urges the Administration not to reduce existing protections, at the same time that it seeks strengthened investment protections for all sectors as part of the FTA. ECAT also supports a strong approach on investment that will not leave key sectors of the economy excluded. ECAT urges U.S. negotiators to seek the elimination of the following barriers as part of the FTA negotiations:
ECAT Position: ECAT supports the timely completion and implementation of a comprehensive, high-standard and commercially meaningful U.S.-Panama FTA that will eliminate tariffs and customs and other non-tariff barriers, further liberalize trade and investment and strengthen disciplines on intellectual property, investment, government procurement and transparency. ECAT strongly urges that the investment protections already accorded to U.S. investors under the U.S.-Panama BIT not be reduced in any new commitments made as part of the FTA. U.S.-Thailand FTA Negotiations The United States launched FTA negotiations with Thailand in June 2004. U.S. goods exports to Thailand equaled $7.2 billion in 2005, with major exports of machinery, medical equipment and precious stones. U.S. goods imports from Thailand equaled $19.9 billion, with significant imports of machinery, precious stones and apparel. U.S. services exports to Thailand equaled $1.1 billion and U.S. services imports from Thailand equaled $924 million in 2004. U.S. foreign direct investment in Thailand equaled $1.7 billion in 2004. ECAT supports a comprehensive and commercially meaningful FTA with Thailand that will focus on key trade and investment issues and address the significant challenges in the market with respect to intellectual property protection. Such an agreement should eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment and help create new opportunities for the United States and Thailand. ECAT strongly urges U.S. negotiators to seek the elimination or reduction of the following barriers as part of the FTA negotiations:
ECAT also strongly supports the conclusion of an “open skies” agreement between the United States and Thailand, which would promote enormous benefits to consumers and support continued growth of aviation and aerospace industries as explained in section IV.2. . ECAT Position: ECAT supports the timely completion and implementation of a comprehensive, high-standard and commercially meaningful U.S.-Thailand that will liberalize trade and investment and strengthen disciplines on intellectual property, investment, government procurement and transparency. U.S.-United Arab Emirates FTA Negotiations The United States launched FTA negotiations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in March 2005. U.S. goods exports to the UAE equaled $8.5 billion in 2005, with significant exports of aircraft, machinery, and vehicles. U.S. goods imports from the UAE equaled $1.5 billion in 2005, with significant imports of fuel, chemicals and aluminum. U.S. foreign direct investment in the UAE equaled $386 million in 2004. In March 2004, UAE signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the United States and, in December 2004, it also signed a Container Port Security Initiative with the United States, to protect global trade routes. ECAT supports a comprehensive and commercially meaningful FTA with the UAE that will eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment and help create new commercial opportunities. As with Bahrain and Oman, an FTA with the UAE will enable the Administration to make significant progress in its efforts to establish a Middle East FTA. ECAT strongly urges U.S. negotiators to seek the elimination of the following barriers as part of the FTA negotiations:
ECAT also seeks strong protections for U.S. investors, including the free transfer of capital, fair and equitable treatment, protections against expropriation and full access to investor-state dispute settlement for breaches of the agreement or investment agreements. As well, ECAT seeks the UAE’s commitment to join the WTO ITA as a full participant with shortest staging of benefits possible. ECAT Position: ECAT supports the timely completion and implementation of a comprehensive, high-standard and commercially meaningful U.S.-UAE FTA that will further liberalize trade and investment, eliminate tariff and customs and other non-tariff barriers and strengthen disciplines on intellectual property, investment, government procurement and transparency. U.S.-South Africa Customs Union FTA Negotiations The United States launched FTA negotiations in June 2003 with the South African Customs Union (SACU), comprised of South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, and Lesotho. Several negotiating rounds have been held, but progress has slowed and there is no set date for the conclusion of the SACU FTA. The SACU already represents the largest U.S. export market in sub-Saharan Africa, with U.S. exports totaling more than $4.1 billion in 2005. Major exports include vehicles, machinery, aircraft, and medical equipment. U.S. imports from the SACU equaled $6.8 billion in 2005, with significant imports of precious stones, iron and steel, apparel and machinery. ECAT supports a comprehensive and commercially meaningful FTA with the SACU that will eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment and help create new commercial opportunities. ECAT strongly urges U.S. negotiators to seek the elimination of the following barriers as part of the FTA negotiations:
As well, ECAT seeks commitments by Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland to join the WTO ITA as a full participant with shortest staging of benefits possible. ECAT Position: ECAT supports the completion and implementation of a comprehensive, high-standard and commercially meaningful U.S.-SACU FTA that will further liberalize trade and investment, eliminate tariff and customs and other non-tariff barriers and strengthen disciplines on intellectual property, investment, government procurement and transparency. Free Trade Area of the Americas Negotiations The ongoing Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations, formally launched in 1998, have the potential for creating the largest free trade area in the world, covering approximately 800 million people with a combined GDP of nearly $11 trillion. At the third Summit of the Americas in April 2001, the leaders of the 34 nations negotiating the FTAA agreed that negotiations would be completed by January 2005 – a deadline that was not met. In 2002, trade ministers initiated market-access negotiations, began a review of the second draft FTAA text and launched a Hemispheric Cooperation Program. The United States, which became a co-chair of the negotiations with Brazil in November 2002, has enormous benefits to reap from the FTAA and will need to play a leadership role to help move negotiations forward. In 2003, the FTAA negotiations took a very different turn, with the 34 leaders agreeing to a two-track process at the Eighth FTAA Ministerial in Miami in November 2003. This was the result of significant disagreements among key countries, including Brazil and others in MERCOSUR that sought an FTAA focused on market access, as opposed to broader rules, which the United States, Canada and other countries in the Hemisphere have long supported as part of the FTAA process. Negotiations then stalled in 2004 and 2005 as countries were unable to reach agreement on key issues regarding the two-track process. Meanwhile, two-way goods trade between the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere has more than doubled since 1990 to $976 billion in 2005. The share of the total value of U.S. trade accounted for by countries participating in the FTAA negotiations increased from 33 percent in 1990 to 38 percent in 2005. U.S. exports to the region equaled $400 billion, accounting for 44 percent of total U.S. exports to all destinations in 2005. Imports from the region equaled $576 billion, accounting for 34.5 percent of total U.S. imports from all destinations in 2005. Background on the Negotiations At the 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas, the United States joined 33 other nations of the Western Hemisphere – excluding Cuba – in agreeing to conclude a FTAA by 2005. FTAA negotiations were officially launched at the second Summit of the Americas meeting held in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998. The Santiago Summit Declaration endorsed the start of the FTAA negotiations and reaffirmed the goal of completing negotiations by 2005 – a deadline that was not met. It called for concrete progress, including specific business-facilitation measures, to be achieved by 2000. The Declaration states that the FTAA is to be balanced, comprehensive, and WTO-consistent, as well as to constitute a single undertaking (meaning signatories must adhere to all aspects of the agreement). The Declaration further provides that the negotiating process must be transparent and take into account the differences in the level of development and size of the economies in the Americas. The Declaration established the following negotiating groups: market access, agriculture, investment, services, government procurement, dispute settlement, intellectual property rights, subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties, and competition policy. The following three consultative committees were established to provide support to negotiators: the FTAA Consultative Group on Smaller Economies, the FTAA Committee of Experts on Electronic Commerce, and the FTAA Committee on Civil Society. There is a FTAA Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) that oversees the entire negotiation process. The FTAA Trade Ministerial in Toronto, Canada, in November 1999 directed negotiators to begin to develop a draft text of an FTAA agreement to be ready for the next ministerial meeting to be held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in April 2001. Trade ministers also endorsed the launch of a round of WTO trade negotiations and the goal of seeking the complete elimination of agricultural export subsidies. The trade ministers adopted eight customs facilitation measures to be implemented by January 2000. USTR announced the conclusion of an Inter-American Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for conformity assessment of telecommunications equipment. The MRA simplifies the conformity assessment procedures for testing and certification of telecommunications equipment. Throughout 2000, the FTAA negotiating groups met to discuss and put together draft-bracketed texts on each of the issues under negotiation. The United States submitted comprehensive proposals on each of the main issues in that year. The sixth Ministerial meeting was held in Buenos Aires, followed by the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in April 2001. Negotiating groups presented a draft text of the FTAA to the Ministers who recommended its public release. For the first time in a major negotiation, the heads of state agreed to the public release of the draft negotiating text, which was made public on July 3, 2001. The Summit also fixed the end date of the negotiations as January 2005, with entry into force as soon as possible, but no later than December 2005. On May 15, 2002, the market-access phase of the negotiations was initiated. At the seventh Ministerial in Quito, the second draft FTAA text was presented to ministers and also made public with solicitations for public comment. With the strong leadership of the United States, the ministers also agreed to a Hemispheric Cooperation Program through which countries would identify their capacity-building needs and programs would be developed to assist small and developing countries so that they can fully reap the benefits of the FTAA. Status of the Negotiations and Outlook for 2006 At the Eighth FTAA Ministerial in Miami in November 2003, ministers of the 34 countries agreed to pursue a common set of obligations, while allowing any interested countries to also undertake additional obligations and benefits where there is no consensus at the hemispheric level. The ministers directed that a definition of the comprehensive set of common obligations be prepared, as well as procedures for their negotiation. The creation of what some have called a two-tier approach resulted from concerns that the 34 countries could not bridge significant differences on the level of commitments sought to be obtained within the deadline of the negotiations. In significant part, Brazil and its partners in MERCOSUR, favored a much-reduced set of obligations, particularly in areas beyond market access. Rather than pursuing the FTAA over a longer period of time – while negotiating and consolidating comprehensive and high-standard bilateral and sub-regional FTAs (such as the U.S.-Chile FTA, CAFTA, or the U.S.-Peru-Colombia FTA) – or pursuing an FTA without those countries that did not want to achieve a comprehensive high-standard agreement, the United States and other countries in the Hemisphere who had sought a more comprehensive and higher standard agreement agreed to this compromise in an effort to realize concrete progress by 2005. As a result of this compromise, however, it is expected that comprehensive protections on investment, state-of-the art intellectual property protections and a negative-list approach to services will not likely be incorporated as part of the common set of obligations. ECAT recognizes that the Administration is continuing to press for the inclusion of these commitments, particularly in the area of intellectual property rights with Brazil, which has already largely adopted many of the key intellectual property rights protections in its own law. Efforts to reach a consensus on the framework on the common set of obligations, as well as procedures for their negotiation, have yet to be successful. At the Fourth Summit of the Americas in November 2005 in Argentina, the United States and a majority of the FTAA countries supported a continuation of the negotiations and called for ministers to resume meetings in 2006. While meetings are likely to be held in 2006, there remains significant resistance among a few countries to further progress on these negotiations. Importance of the FTAA Negotiations As originally conceived, the FTAA negotiations presented an enormous possibility to eliminate barriers to trade and investment in the Western Hemisphere, which already accounts for 38 percent of total U.S. trade and 44 percent of total U.S. exports. A comprehensive and high standard FTAA would provide U.S. farmers, manufacturers and service providers expanded export and investment opportunities that will help sustain U.S. economic growth and the high standard of living in the United States. Improved disciplines in intellectual property and investment and strong dispute settlement rules would help ensure that U.S. interests are protected. As trade alliances deepen, so too would political, economic and security alliances that are critical to the United States in the decades ahead. With the new approach adopted by the 34 ministers in Miami, the opportunities presented by the FTAA are somewhat more ambiguous, but hugely important. Significant commitments in market access for agriculture, services and industrial goods could have very concrete benefits for U.S. farmers, companies and their workers. It can help level the playing field. Much depends on what is left off the table at the end of the day and the extent to which a significant block of countries adopts a comprehensive, high-standard upper tier of commitments that creates inducements over time for Brazil and other countries to agree to such standards. ECAT Position: ECAT supports significant progress through FTAA negotiations to eliminate barriers to agriculture, goods and services trade and develop strong, comprehensive protections with respect to investment and intellectual property rights that will promote economic growth and development and the rule of law throughout the Western Hemisphere. ECAT also supports further concrete progress in creating a transparent and predictable Customs environment in the Western emisphere for U.S. exporters and importers. Consideration of Future FTAs In addition to the FTAs discussed above, ECAT member companies remain interested in the potential for other FTAs that could be negotiated. As discussed above, ECAT is very interested in the negotiations with Korea and Malaysia, both of which are major trading and investment partners and would welcomes efforts to explore potential FTA negotiations with other countries where there is a significant and growing commercial relationship. ECAT companies recognize the difficulties in engaging in such negotiations with any of the common market countries of the European Union or even of such a negotiation with Japan, India, Indonesia or other key trading partners. Yet, the market potential of negotiating comprehensive and high-standard agreements with such countries and others, sooner, rather than later, should be an issue squarely on the U.S. trade and investment negotiating agenda.
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