In its 2001 report on FDI in Least Developed Countries at a Glance, UNCTAD emphasized that increased foreign direct investment is of “particular importance” to achieve sustainable poverty-reducing growth and development in the poorest countries. Strong investor protections in developing countries are also critical to foster the rule of law, to reduce corruption and build institutions, to promote respect for and protection of private property and contract rights, and to create a regulatory environment hospitable to capital formation in general and international investment in particular. Without these protections, foreign investment will simply not flow to the developing countries that need it most. Several studies have also emphasized the importance of educating the workforce and other ways to develop capacity to promote a greater influx of foreign investment. Foreign investment and investment protections promote transparency and a market-based free enterprise system. Foreign investment also serves as a model in many countries for improved workers conditions and environmental practices, as well as respect for labor rights.

Importance of Foreign Investment for Developing Countries Investment overseas by U.S. companies is critical for supporting global economic growth and the reduction of poverty overseas. Already global foreign direct investment flows are the largest external source of financing for developing countries, equal to about one-third of developing countries’ GDP and generating some 53 million jobs in developing countries, according to UNCTAD. UNCTAD further explains: “Foreign direct investment (FDI) has the potential to generate employment, raise productivity, transfer skills and technology, enhance exports and contribute to the long-term economic development of the world’s developing countries. More than ever, countries at all levels of development seek to leverage FDI for development.”

An UNCTAD study, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, documents another important trend in investment: the rapid increase in the number of bilateral investment treaties concluded during the 1990s. In particular, UNCTAD found that the number of treaties almost quintupled during the last decade, rising from 385 at the end of the 1980s to 1,857 at the end of the 1990s. The UNCTAD report also noted that there has been an enormous increase in treaties concluded by developing countries and Central and Eastern European countries, rising from 63 at the end of the 1980s to 833 at the end of 1999. The United States, however, ranks only 26th in the number of bilateral investment treaties that it had concluded by the end of 1999. Since that time, the United States has negotiated one new bilateral investment treaty with Uruguay and has included very similar provisions in investment chapters in free trade agreements with Chile, Singapore, Morocco, Central America and the Dominican Republic, Oman, Peru and Colombia. Negotiations are ongoing with several other countries.

ECAT Studies and the Importance of International Investment to the U.S. Economy

In 1998, ECAT released its study, Global Investments, American Returns (GIAR), of U.S. foreign direct investment in the agricultural, manufacturing, and services sector. This study was updated in 1999. Both the original study and the 1999 Update documented some key findings about the impact of foreign investment on the United States and its workers, including:

• American companies with global operations make important contributions to the U.S. standard of living that in many cases are greater than those of purely domestic firms. For the last 20 years, American companies with global operations have accounted for over half of U.S. research and development, capital investments, and exports and, thereby, have helped boost overall U.S. productivity.

• Outbound U.S. foreign direct investment complements economic activity here at home, thereby increasing the U.S. standard of living. Foreign affiliate activity generates purchases from U.S. suppliers, U.S. research and development, and trade. Given that the U.S. and foreign activities of American companies tend to complement one another, the ability of these companies to raise the U.S. standard of living is strengthened by their ability to invest abroad. Restrictions on foreign investment, which prevent U.S. companies from expanding abroad, generally reduce U.S. parent activity and, thus, lower the U.S. standard of living.

• American companies with global operations depend upon American suppliers and their American workers. For the last two decades, the U.S. parents of American companies with global operations consistently have purchased more than 90 percent of their supplies (or intermediate inputs) from U.S.-based, not foreign, suppliers.

In addition to these key findings, the GIAR study and the 1999 Update also noted that American firms with global operations pay higher wages than purely domestic firms. For non-production or white-collar workers the wage difference is nearly 10 percent, and for production or blue-collar workers it is even higher.

Based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. companies with global operations employed 30.6 million workers worldwide in 2002, of which over 73 percent (22.4 million) were employed in the United States, accounting for one-fifth of total U.S. employment in the United States.

In January 2003, ECAT released Mainstay IV: Technology, Trade and Investment: The Public Opinion Disconnect. This study, as detailed in more depth in section I.1, documents that trade and investment are critical components supporting the growth in productivity and the increase in U.S. living standards that the United States has enjoyed over the last decade.

This study examines in particular the relationship between trade and investment and the growth in the production and in the use of information and communication technology (ICT) products – products that have together accounted for about two-thirds of the acceleration in U.S. labor productivity over this period. This acceleration has been much celebrated, as labor productivity is often considered to be the single best measure of a country’s overall standard of living. The faster growth rate of recent years implies that U.S. living standards now double in only 28 years – a generation faster than the previous growth rate. The study examines the role of both ICT-producing and ICT-consuming industries in supporting the acceleration in U.S. productivity. ICT-producing industries1 have high levels of exports, imports and foreign investment and are much more trade intensive than is the overall U.S. economy. Much of their output entails multiple production stages across multiple countries, all linked via trade and investment. Exports are important not just for the U.S. parents, but also for their foreign affiliates. The acceleration in quality improvements and price declines in many ICT products is related to key liberalizations in the WTO and elsewhere, including the 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the 1997 Information Technology Agreement and the 1997 Basic Telecommunications Agreement.

ICT-consuming industries2 -- those industries that use ICT heavily – are also industries whose exports represent a high share of total output and, for decades, have had higher levels of exports, imports and total trade as a share of total sales. Global production networks have deepened and widened in key ICT industries. Two of the most intensive ICT-using industries – telecommunications and financial services – have benefited from trade and investment liberalization in the WTO and elsewhere, including the 1997 Basic Telecommunications Agreement and the 1997 Financial Services Agreement. 1 ICT-producing industries produce the hardware, software and services – computers, semiconductors, electronics, and information services to name just a few – involved in collecting, processing and sharing information. 2 These industries, such as telecommunications and financial services, invest heavily in ICT products and services.

The key conclusion of Mainstay IV is that trade and investment play a critical role in fostering the growth of and the demand for ICT in ways that support increased productivity and economic growth in the United States.

National Security Reviews of Foreign Investments

The 1988 Exon-Florio amendment to Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 provides authority to the President to suspend or prohibit any foreign acquisition, merger or takeover of a U.S. corporation that is determined to threaten the national security of the United States. The President can exercise this authority only if he finds:

• there is credible evidence that the foreign entity exercising control might take action that threatens national security, and
• the provisions of law, other than the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, do not provide adequate and appropriate authority to protect the national security.

The President’s investigative authority was delegated to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) — an interagency committee, now including 12 agencies, that was first established in 1975. CFIUS is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and includes the following government representatives:

Government Representatives on CFIUS From Executive Branch agencies: Department of Commerce Department of Defense Department of State Department of Justice Department of Homeland Security Department of the Treasury   From the Office of the President:   Council of Economic Advisors Office of United States Trade Representative National Economic Council Office of Management and Budget National Security Council Office of Science and Technology

Once CFIUS receives notification of an acquisition, merger or takeover, it begins a 30-day review process. CFIUS decisions must be made by a consensus of the entire committee and any CFIUS member may raise concerns over any potential threat to U.S. national security. CFIUS members also rely on sensitive, classified and business confidential information in making their analysis. The statute also provides explicitly that nothing in the statute prevents the disclosure of information to Congress.

The statute enumerates the following factors that the President (and CFIUS) may consider in reviewing the transaction:

• domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements;
• the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technology, materials, and other supplies and services;
• the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national security;
• the potential effects of the transaction on the sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to a country that supports terrorism or proliferates missile technology or chemical and biological weapons; and
• the potential effects of the transaction on U.S. technological leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security.

If CFIUS determines there is no potential threat, the parties are notified and the transaction is allowed to proceed. If CFIUS determines that there are potential national security threats by a proposed transaction, it will proceed with a full investigation that must be completed within 45 days after the decision to proceed with the investigation is made. CFIUS also has the authority, which it has used in several instances as a condition to allow an investment to proceed, to seek assurances and modifications in the investment structure or other aspects of the investor’s operation in the United States or abroad to ensure that U.S. national security is protected.

Section 837(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (the so-called "Byrd Amendment") amended Section 721 of the Defense Production Act by requiring a 45-day investigation if the party acquiring a U.S. company is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government and the acquisition “could result in control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S. that could affect the national security of the U.S."

If the 45-day investigation concludes that there is a potential national security threat, the President then has the authority to block or suspend the transaction at issue. The President is required to make a decision within 15 days.

In 2006, several proposals – some major, some minor – have been made to reform the national security investment review process, including the following:

Modification Proposals Change the chair of the CFIUS process to the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, or the Department of Commerce; Add vice chairs to the CFIUS; Authorize notification to Congress of CFIUS reviews and investigations; Authorize public notice of reviews and public hearings; Explicitly define national security to encompass any transaction acquiring critical infrastructure; Specify that review covers economic and/or homeland security; Deny foreign acquisitions of ownership, management or operation of U.S. critical infrastructure; Require a 45-day investigation in all cases where the acquirer is a state-owned company or where the investment is in critical infrastructure; Combine the 30-day review and 45-day investigation into one process and possibly lengthen it; and Authorize Congressional denial of specific transactions.

As the Administration and Congress consider these and other reform proposals, ECAT is very concerned by proposals that would undermine the current objective review process, as well as inward and outward investment that are critical for U.S. economic and job growth, without enhancing U.S. national security at home. At present, the operation of the CFIUS process ensures a fair and objective and fact-based review process through which 12 different government agencies, with substantial expertise, can review confidential and classified information. The scope of the review and subsequent investigation is sufficiently broad and flexible, without being over-expansive.

Modifying the basic structure of CFIUS could have several very substantial and unintended adverse consequences that could harm national security more than it could enhance it, including:

• Overwhelming the CFIUS process – by drastically altering the scope of investigations or requiring investigations in all cases, all cases involving state-owned companies or all cases involving investment sin critical infrastructure. Subjecting significant numbers of transactions to review and investigation would not only waste valuable government resources, it would take away the valuable time of government agencies to focus on the actual transactions that have potential national security implications.
• Effectively downgrading the use of sensitive, classified and business confidential information in the review process through per se judgments based, for example, on nationality or the views of persons without sufficient access or ability to review such information.
• Subjecting U.S. investors overseas to subjective, politicized investment review processes, resulting in the denial of U.S. investments that promote stability, economic growth and access to critical resources and infrastructure, and harming thereby U.S. national security.
• Chilling foreign investment in the United States and denying, as a result, significant economic opportunities to Americans who benefit substantially from foreign investment in the United States.

Efforts to modify the national security investment review process must not be accomplished in a hasty or impulsive manner that results in unintended and adverse consequences to broader U.S. national security interests. ECAT, therefore, urges that the United States maintain a full, fact-based, fair and effective U.S. national security investment review process that encourages critical investments that also support U.S. national security.

ECAT Position: ECAT supports the need for a fact-based and objective national security investment review process that focuses on potential national security threats of proposed acquisitions. ECAT urges that efforts to modify the existing review process proceed carefully and seek to preserve and build upon the strengths of the existing process to protect U.S. national security. In reviewing reform proposals, ECAT also urges decision-makers to consider the important national security interests that outward U.S. investments serve in promoting stability, economic growth and access to critical resources and infrastructure.

U.S. Negotiating Position on Investment Protections

The United States has led the world in promoting strong investment protections in more than 38 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and several free trade agreements (FTAs), including the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Chile, Singapore, Morocco, Central American and Dominican Republic, Oman, Peru and Colombia FTAs. These protections are largely based on the rights enshrined in the Takings, Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution and over 200 years of U.S. jurisprudence. In particular, U.S. BITs and recent FTA investment chapters include the following core commitments:

NO DISCRIMINATION in favor of domestic investors or other foreign investors (the better of national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment). TREATMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. PROMPT COMPENSATION FOR DIRECT AND INDIRECT EXPROPRIATIONS. PROTECTION FOR THE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL, including the repatriation of profits. NO PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS, such as requirements that investors source inputs locally or export finished products. RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES between investors and governments before objective, impartial arbitral tribunals with respect to treaty claims and existing and future investment agreements.

Replicating these basic protections in future trade and investment agreements is essential to protect critical U.S. investments abroad.

Investment protections were a core issue in the Congressional debate on Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) that was ultimately enacted as part of the Trade Act of 2002 in August 2002. Following passage of TPA, the Administration continued its interagency review of the U.S. negotiating position on investment and made a number of significant changes in the U.S. position, which are now reflected in several recently concluded Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), the revised Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the Uruguay BIT. Discussed below are the importance of investment protections, the Congressional debate and framework on investment, the investment provisions in recently concluded FTAs and the Model BIT, and a brief review of the operation of U.S. BITs and NAFTA Chapter 11, including a summary of noteworthy investment cases.

Importance of Strong Investment Protections

The investment protections contained in BITs and FTA investment chapters are critical for U.S. businesses that invest around the world, where legal systems are less developed and investments are oftentimes at a very high risk. U.S. BITs have traditionally provided core protections that help ensure the security and long-term viability of investments that are critical not only for U.S. companies, but for broader national U.S. interests, such as developing stable sources of energy supplies, continuing the United States’ leadership in creating new and advanced technologies and promoting stability, economic development and the rule of law.

While many U.S. companies have not needed to employ the formal investor-state dispute settlement procedures in BITs and FTAs, these protections are critical to resolving disputes. When faced with foreign government actions that violate these protections, investors are able to point to the government’s obligations under such agreements, which oftentimes spurs a resolution – in large part because of the comprehensive nature of such protections and their clarity. Furthermore, U.S. companies account for approximately one-third of the BIT claims filed before the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Weakening these provisions will undermine U.S. interests and is likely to create an even greater need for resort to the formal dispute settlement procedures.

Trade Promotion Authority Provisions on Investment

Investment has been a principal negotiating objective in trade negotiating authority legislation since 1984. Congress included strong negotiating objectives on investment in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, including the core protections, while making several improvements, including with respect to transparency.

In 2002, Congress debated an amendment that would have revised the negotiating objective in a manner that would weaken protections against expropriation and for fair and equitable treatment, create a safe harbor for all but intentionally discriminatory public welfare regulations, and mandate particular negotiating outcomes. ECAT led a business community effort to educate the Senate on the technical details of these investment issues and to explain business community concerns about how this amendment would weaken important investment protections. The Senate rejected this amendment by a vote of 55-to-41. Instead, Congress approved an investment-negotiating objective in TPA that sought to ensure high protections for U.S. investors abroad consistent with U.S. legal principles and practice in several important respects. It included the following:

NO DISCRIMINATION in favor of domestic investors or other foreign investors (the better of national treatment or most favored nation treatment). TREATMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, including fair and equitable treatment, consistent with U.S. legal principles and practice, and full protection and security. PROMPT COMPENSATION FOR DIRECT AND INDIRECT EXPROPRIATIONS, consistent with U.S. legal principles and practice. PROTECTION FOR THE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL, including the repatriation of profits. NO PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS, such as requirements that investors source inputs locally or export finished products. RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES between investors and governments before objective, impartial arbitral tribunals, with improvements to weed out frivolous claims, to improve the selection of arbitrators, and establish an appellate or review mechanism. THE FULLEST MEASURE OF TRANSPARENCY in disputes between investors and governments. NO GREATER SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS with respect to investment protections should be provided to foreign investors in the United States compared to U.S. investors in the United States.

Investment Protections in Recent Free Trade Agreements, the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty and the Uruguay BIT

Following enactment of the Trade Act of 2002, the Administration continued its inter-agency review of the U.S. negotiating position on investment. The Administration put forward several important changes to the U.S. negotiating position that are now largely reflected in the Singapore, Chile, Morocco, Central America-Dominican Republic, Oman, Peru and Colombia FTAs. In November 2004, the Administration also concluded its internal deliberations on the revised Model BIT and in December 2004, signed the first U.S. BIT negotiated since the early 1990s with Uruguay.

The Administration has taken major steps to address Congress’ objectives on investment, including the following provisions found in recent FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Morocco, DR-CAFTA, Oman, Peru and Colombia, as well as the revised Model BIT and the Uruguay BIT), including:

• Incorporating the test from landmark Supreme Court case Penn Central Transp. v. New York City on what constitutes an indirect expropriation.
• Defining expropriation in terms of “property rights or property interests” based on the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause.
• Defining “fair and equitable treatment” in terms of due process rights.
• Clarifying that non-discriminatory, regulatory government actions designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, only rarely result in indirect expropriations.
• Defining expropriation and fair and equitable protections as reflecting customary international law, defined as the “general and consistent practice of States,” which includes the United States.
• Creating a motion to dismiss process based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
• Including provisions to ensure the fullest possible transparency and the ability of panels to accept amicus briefs.
• Including the most concrete language in any FTA to date on a timeframe for negotiating an investor-state appellate or other review procedure.

While ECAT is very supportive of the increased transparency, procedural and many other innovations, ECAT remains very concerned, however, that some provisions included in recent FTAs have lowered the standard of protection for U.S. investors abroad below that enjoyed by foreign investors in the United States. Since foreign investors in the United States already enjoy access to U.S. laws and the U.S. court system, which provide for a wider range of challenges, these changes will not affect foreign investors in the United States or U.S. liability, but will only have a significant adverse impact on U.S. investors abroad.

ECAT formally presented its views to the Administration on the proposed Model BIT in a letter dated December 18, 2003 and worked with the Administration and others in the private sector on these issues until the revision of the Model BIT was completed in November 2004. Despite some advances, ECAT remains concerned by the following issues:

Excluding national treatment and MFN obligations from arbitration represents a major setback from prior practice and will leave U.S. investors in financial institutions abroad without effective protection. Several prior BITs, including most notably the U.S-Argentine BIT, provided relatively fulsome protections for U.S. investors in Argentina (although the United States took full reservations). The potential state-to-state mechanism that is available when commitments are made is a politicized process and likely one that the U.S. government would not seek to utilize against a foreign government’s financial measures, even if discriminatory.

The Uruguay BIT included some important innovations with respect to the financial services exception, including language that clarifies that the financial services exception is not applicable to “measures that expressly nullify or amend contractual provisions that specify the currency of denomination or the rate of the exchange of currencies.” This language should be included in all future FTAs and BITs where the financial services exception is maintained.

There also remains concern that the language that seeks to define when certain public welfare regulations are not an expropriation is far too broad and more expansive than U.S. takings precedent.

In the Chile and Singapore FTAs, annexes to the investment chapters include some limitations on an investor’s access to dispute settlement with respect to certain claims involving restrictions on the flow of certain types of capital. In particular, the annexes provide that with respect to short-term capital other than foreign direct investment, investors must wait one year (rather than six months) to seek arbitration in the event of a capital control. Further, they provide that a government is not liable if a capital control involving short-term flows is in place for less than one year and the capital control does not “substantially impede” a transfer. This model should not be replicated in future FTAs or BITs.

In the November 2004 revised Model BIT, the Administration abandoned its prospective-only protection for investment agreements. Rather, the 2004 Model BIT more appropriately includes a more detailed definition of investment agreements, while also providing access to investor-state dispute settlement for breaches of existing as well as future investment agreements. This language was included in the Uruguay BIT signed in December 2004, as well as the Oman, Peru and Colombia FTAs. ECAT urges similar language to be included in all future FTAs and BITs.

As described in section IV.4, the United States also deviated from its high-standard investment model in the recently concluded U.S.-Australia FTA, which failed to include any protections (not even prospective) for investment agreements and provided no investor-state mechanism at all, although the parties committed to reviewing the latter issue if circumstances warranted.

The impetus for the changes in investment protections appears largely to result from a generalized, but theoretical, concern that the United States could itself face liability under the rules it has traditionally supported. Thus, there has been a push by some to lower protections for U.S. investors abroad in the belief that the United States, as a potential defendant, will have less legal exposure. In fact, while lessening protections does indeed expose U.S. investors to greater risk abroad, it does not appreciably lessen the potential liability of the United States because these treaty rules are for the most part already reflected in U.S. law. In the wake of weakened treaty protections, foreign investors in the United States will still enjoy access to an independent judiciary applying similar level protections as afforded by the traditional investor-state mechanism – this time under U.S. law. By contrast, U.S. investors abroad will be left to the vagaries of local law and local courts.

Operation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and NAFTA Chapter 11

U.S. BITs and FTAs, in most respects, set forth strong investment protections and provide investors with the opportunity to seek review of governmental action before international arbitration panels, such ICSID. As explained above, these rules are very important for U.S. commercial, as well as our broader economic, energy and security interests.

In recent years, some have raised concern about a number of cases filed pursuant to the provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11. (Notably, the United States has never been subject to an investor-state claim under any of the 38 BITs in force). In fact, there have only been 42 cases filed against all three NAFTA countries (Canada, Mexico and the United States) in 10 years – far fewer than the 195 expropriation-only cases filed against the U.S. federal government in 2004 alone.

Even more importantly, none of the cases has reached the type of conclusion that NAFTA’s critics have feared. Even the frequently complained of Methanex case saw all claims dismissed this past summer. Indeed, in the four decisions that have been reached in Chapter 11 cases against the United States, the investors’ claims have been rejected:

• Methanex v. United States. Canadian-based Methanex challenged California’s ban of the gasoline additive methyl-butyl ether (MTBE) as expropriatory, discriminatory and violating the minimum standard of treatment under Chapter 11. Contrary to claims that this case represents how the NAFTA rules provide foreign investors with greater rights than U.S. investors, these claims could largely have been brought in U.S. court. On August 9, 2005, a NAFTA panel dismissed all of the claims and awarded the United States legal fees of approximately $4 million.

• ADF Group Inc. v. United States. A Canadian corporation challenged U.S. law that requires the purchase of domestically produced steel for certain highway projects. In January 2003, the arbitration panel rejected ADF’s claim in its entirety.

• Mondev International v. United States. A Canadian corporation challenged the judgments by a court that provided immunity to a U.S. regulatory entity. In October 2002, the arbitration panel rejected Mondev’s claim in its entirety.

• Loewen v. United States. The formerly Canadian-based funeral home company Loewen was challenged in Mississippi court by a U.S. funeral home over transactions involving less than $5 million. A jury awarded the U.S. funeral home $500 million in punitive damages. This award was the largest in Mississippi’s history and equaled 78 percent of Loewen’s net worth. (According to Loewen’s pleadings, the $400 million punitive award was 50 times greater than the largest punitive award ever considered by the Mississippi Supreme Court and 200 times greater than the largest award ever upheld by that Court.) Under Mississippi law, Loewen could only appeal this decision if it posted bond equal to 125 percent of the verdict. While Mississippi law permits a court to reduce or eliminate the bond requirement for “good cause,” Loewen’s petition for reduction/elimination was rejected. As a result of the onerous and bankrupting bond requirements, which the Mississippi courts failed to reduce, Loewen was effectively prevented from appealing its case in the Mississippi court system. Without an effective ability to appeal, Loewen settled the case for $175 million and brought a claim under NAFTA Chapter 11. In 2003, this claim was rejected by the investor-state panel reviewing it on both substantive and procedural grounds.

Other cases have been wrongly criticized as overturning environmental and other safety laws. In fact, arbitration panels can only award damages and cannot change law.

Furthermore, the cases that have been most heavily criticized are ones where the foreign courts found that the foreign governments had acted wrongly:

• Ethyl v. Canada. The U.S.-based Ethyl Corporation challenged Canada’s legislation banning the importation of a fuel additive, MMT (methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl). The NAFTA panel never issued a decision in this case. Rather, the Government of Canada settled it after it lost a similar case in its own court system brought by Canadian provinces. The court found that Canada’s importation ban (while still allowing domestic production) was not justified as an environmental provision, but was discriminatory and unjustified.

• Metalclad v. Mexico. After U.S.-based Metalclad had obtained all necessary federal permits for the construction of a waste disposal facility and several environmental studies demonstrated that the facility would reduce waste in the region and not harm the environment, the local jurisdiction denied Metalclad a municipal construction permit. The governor then issued an Ecological Decree for the protection of cactus in the region. A NAFTA panel and then a Mexican court held that the local government action was not justified for environmental reasons but was politically motivated. Both found that the local government had essentially expropriated Metalclad’s investment and ordered the payment of compensation.

ECAT will continue to monitor these cases and others that arise, as well as the full operation of U.S. BITs, NAFTA Chapter 11 and new FTAs containing investment chapters.

ECAT Position: ECAT believes that U.S. trade and international tax policies should recognize the vital importance of U.S. foreign direct investment to U.S. economic growth and should promote the expansion of U.S. trade and investment. ECAT supports, therefore, a strong U.S. negotiating position on investment that promotes market access and investment protections for the benefit of U.S. companies, workers and their families and the U.S. economy. ECAT recognizes that Congress’ objectives on investment negotiations in the Trade Act of 2002 have been substantially incorporated into new agreements, although ECAT strongly believes that these objectives could more effectively be implemented through provisions providing stronger protections for U.S. investment abroad, particularly with respect to fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, compensation for expropriation (including with respect to all forms of property recognized in the United States, including contract rights) and full access to arbitration for U.S. financial services institutions, for breaches of existing and future investment agreements and for all U.S. investors with respect to financial services measures. The United States should also refrain from weakening existing agreements or undermining protections already provided in existing BITs through the negotiation of new free trade agreements and instead ensure that the FTAs reflect the high-standard commitments discussed above.

OECD Policy Framework for Investment

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has prepared with OECD members and 30 developing countries a draft "Policy Framework for Investment" expected to be finalized in the spring of 2006. The Policy Framework seeks to provide a guidepost for developing countries to spur investment through adopting improved regimes in a number of policy areas, including investment, trade, tax, competition, human resources, governance, infrastructure and financial services.

ECAT welcomes the efforts of the OECD to create a useable, practical blueprint to help developing countries further develop and reform their economies to create a healthy climate for investment. The breadth of issues covered in this blueprint is extremely useful to demonstrate the many facets that affect the growth of international investment flows from reform in specific policy areas to investment protection and transparency. ECAT has urged the OECD to incorporate several modifications to its Policy Framework to reflect the interrelationship of policy reforms, including with respect to transparency and the need to properly reflect the general rules of international law regarding expropriations and other issues are properly emphasized.

ECAT POSITION: ECAT supports the OECD’s efforts to formulate and create a program to promote the utilization of a strong guidepost for developing countries to spur investment through adopting improved regimes in a number of policy areas, including investment, trade, tax, competition, human resources, governance, infrastructure and financial services.

OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises

At the June 2000 OECD Council meeting, the 29 OECD member countries and the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Slovakia adopted a revised set of Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. These Guidelines, which have been revised periodically since their creation in 1976 as part of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, represent legally non-binding recommendations from the OECD governments to businesses, with the aim of preventing conflict and promoting greater confidence and predictability between businesses and the countries in which they operate.

The revised Guidelines attempt to address many of the concerns raised about the increasing globalization of the world economy. In particular, the Guidelines were revised to include recommendations that companies contribute to the abolition of child labor and all forms of forced or compulsory labor. The recommendations on the environment encourage companies to improve their own environmental performance through a variety of means, including the creation of a system of environmental management and stronger contingency planning. The Guidelines updated the chapter on disclosure to reflect the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance. The Guidelines also incorporated a general policy provision on respecting human rights, as well as new chapters on combating bribery and on consumer protection. The revised recommendations also focused on the need to enhance efforts to implement the Guidelines through the National Contact Points, which have been established in member countries to promote adherence to the guidelines. The Guidelines clarified as well the role of the OECD’s Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, which should continue to provide clarifications of the Guidelines and a forum for their review and implementation.

Copyright 1999-2002, the Emergency Committee for American Trade